

AD-A065 635

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL WASHINGTON DC

F/G 5/11

BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS AGAINST APARTHEID: A CONTINUING STRUGGLE. (U)

JUN 77 W F MERRICK II

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

1 OF 2
AD
AO65835



UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER 03870	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS AGAINST APARTHEID: A CONTINUING STRUGGLE		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Student Research Report, 1945-1977
6. AUTHOR(s) 10 Walter F. Merrick II, LT, USN		7. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS DIA Defense Intelligence School Washington, D. C. 411097		9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
10. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS N/A		11. REPORT DATE 11 Jun 1977
12. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) N/A		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 173 (12/1900)
14. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
15. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES None		
17. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) South Africa, Apartheid, African Nationalism, South Africa Foreign Involvement, U. S.-South african Relations		
18. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The paper describes the pervasive influence of apartheid on South Africa, so as to provide a framework for the continuing struggle of black South Africans against the existing governmental structure. Following the developmental background of apartheid, the mechanical aspects of the system's implementation are discussed with government actions highlighted as they affect black South Africa. Subsequent to providing a basic understanding of the concept of apartheid, the growth of black African nationalism is discussed. The government's policy of separate territorial representation is then addressed, followed by a discussion of the		

LEVEL



(cont)

JUB

DISCLAIMER NOTICE

**THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY
PRACTICABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED
TO DDC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT
NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.**



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

November 30, 1977

Ref: 77-3870

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTENTION: Colonel Karl V. Haendle, USA
Assistant Deputy Director for Security Services

SUBJECT: Research Paper by Walter Forrest Merrick II, "Black
South Africans Against Apartheid: A Continuing Struggle"

We have reviewed the subject research paper and have no objection to
its public disclosure, subject to revision as required by the follow-
ing comment received from OASD(ISA) with which we agree:

"Pages 119-122 should be updated based on public state-
ments by the President, Secretary Vance, and Ambassador
Young during 25 October through 4 November--and based on
the mandatory UN embargo of 4 November against the sale of
military related items to South Africa. (It is no longer
clear, for example, that the US believes apartheid can be
ended through the enlargement of South Africa's relations
with the rest of the world; also, it should be noted that
the Administration is in fact reviewing US economic rela-
tionships with South Africa.)"

Robert E. Kellogg
Robert E. Kellogg

Chief, OSI Division

Directorate for Freedom of Information
and Security Review

Attachment

ADDITIONAL	
OSI	White Section <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
OSI	Diff Section <input type="checkbox"/>
OSI/SOURCE	<input type="checkbox"/>
JUSTIFICATION	
ST	
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES	
Dist. Avail. and/or SPECIAL	
A	23

79 03 12 098

BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS AGAINST APARTHEID:

A CONTINUING STRUGGLE

CLEARED

NOV 3 1977

NOV 3 1977

DIRECTOR FOR POLICY OF INFORMATION
AND SECURITY REVIEW BOARD
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AS AMENDED


See memo. to Dir., D17

An Intelligence Research Paper

Presented to

the Faculty of the

Defense Intelligence School



A

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

by

Walter Forrest Merrick II

June 1977

03870

-A-

ABSTRACT

↘ The Republic of South Africa, the most economically and militarily prominent nation in the southern portion of the African continent, has become geo-politically significant in the international arena. Sitting astride key international East-West trade routes, its strategic location at the southwest periphery of the Indian Ocean has caused it to be of major importance to those nations relying upon the Middle East oil reserves. Additionally, the constantly increasing military sphere of influence of the Soviet Union within the Indian Ocean area has caused the strategic import of the Republic to increasingly occupy the attentions of the United States. The political significance of South Africa lies in the system of government its ruling white minority population employs. Apartheid, a policy intended to assure complete and separate development for different races within the Republic, has been opposed by black South Africans since its inception. How the South African government reacts to the increasing opposition of the country's 18 million non-white inhabitants will determine its future as a viable partner of the world's leading nations.

↙ This paper describes the pervasive influence of apartheid on South Africa, so as to provide a framework for the continuing struggle of black South Africans against the existing governmental structure. Following the developmental background of apartheid, the mechanical aspects of

the system's implementation are discussed, with government actions highlighted as they affect "black" South Africa. Subsequent to providing a basic understanding of the apartheid concept, the growth of black African nationalism is discussed. Emphasis is placed upon the formation and activities of the now-outlawed African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), to include the future of these organizations in the struggle for majority rule in South Africa. In addition, the formation and activities of South Africa's two truly national black political parties, the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC) and the South African Student Organization (SASO) are discussed. Here the emphasis is placed upon the efforts of these organizations in opposing the South African Nationalist Party government and its principles of implementation of apartheid. The government's policy of separate territorial representation is then discussed, with an emphasis placed upon self-governing African areas. The government's push toward independent African homelands is highlighted, with future implications of this effort being addressed. The efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) are documented. This organization, the only truly international unified black effort, has been at the forefront in opposing South Africa's apartheid policies. Unfortunately, however, recent developments have diminished the unity within the organization, and consequently its role in the struggle against apartheid. Throughout the history of apartheid.

black South Africans have looked among themselves for leadership. Four prominent black leaders are discussed: Albert Luthuli, who died in banishment after receiving the 1960 Nobel Prize for Peace; Nelson Mandela, who remains imprisoned on Robben Island; Kaiser Matanzima, newly-elected Prime Minister of the Transkei, South Africa's first independent homeland; and Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief of the Kwazulu people and the most outspoken black leader against apartheid. Following a discussion of the roles these men have played in the struggle against apartheid, the future of black leadership in South Africa is addressed. The final discussion centers on the future of majority rule in South Africa. In this discussion, the role of internal factions, both black and white, is addressed, as is the role of the "Third World" nations. The involvements of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States are also included. Finally, pertinent comments are made concerning the future diplomacy of the United States vis-a-vis South Africa's apartheid policies.

Based upon the research conducted in formulating the discussions outlined above, certain cogent conclusions may be offered. At first glance, the South African racial conflict appears to be escalating into war. Presently, prospects of intervention are limited to the Communist bloc. Ultimately, decisions on future intervention depend upon how much strength the Africans themselves can bring to bear. Many outsiders, including exiled South African

intellectuals, feel a multi-racial solution is somehow possible. In pursuit of this goal, South African blacks are engaged in some astute and admirable political maneuvering. If any good does come out of the situation in South Africa, it will most probably be the result of this political maneuvering. Over the short term, present patterns of white domination will continue without any fundamental changes to the system of apartheid. Over the longer term, it appears unlikely that majority rule will come to South Africa. No current evidence exists that suggests the African factions are gaining strength at a rate sufficiently meaningful to overcome the present military and economic strength of the present South African regime.

This paper is an unclassified, library research effort utilizing available open-source material. The study, emphasizing recent sources, is organized in a historical fashion, emphasizing the political importance of the developments noted. The research effort was undertaken so as to provide a firm foundation for the Sub-Saharan Africa intelligence analyst as an adjunct in understanding future developments within the southern cone of the African continent.

PREFACE

Less than a hundred years ago South Africa's sole significance to the outside world derived from its geographical location astride the major line of communication between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Its location continues to lend potential strategic importance to South African ports and airfields. Control of these facilities by other than friendly factions would be a complicating factor in the event of threat to United States and West European oil sources and particularly that portion of the supply that is transported via the route around the Cape. South Africa has the added significance of being the one powerful industrial state in a generally undeveloped continent. By all the recognized criteria, South Africa's economy is strong and self-sustaining and its rate of development is rapid. The United States and various European states have substantial investment and trade interests in South Africa, with a collateral interest in the contribution that orderly marketing of South African gold and precious minerals make to the world financial system.

These factors do not in themselves make South Africa particularly significant for mankind as a whole; yet events in the Republic of South Africa, due to its strategic importance, can affect the destinies of many men; and this is due almost entirely to its political system, which is unique in the modern world. In no other system in a major

sovereign state is overriding power exercised by a minority racial group. In no other such system is the maintenance of racial stratification the primary object of policy. It is a system in which the leveling effects of urbanization are countered by political processes.

Due to the Republic of South Africa's unique position and system the situational aspects of biography, geography, sociology, economics, and politics are all present within the discussions which follow. These discussions are designed to afford the reader a well-based understanding of the South African socio-political system--an understanding required as a basis for assessing South Africa's future role in the international arena.

It is for these reasons that this paper is presented. The need for a firm understanding of the events leading up to the present socio-political system in South Africa, the current administration of the system, and the future prospects of the system will drive this discussion.

A great amount of material has been produced concerning the history, geography, political developments, and institutionalized system of government within the Republic of South Africa. However, the majority of material produced has been written from the point-of-view of either white South Africans, or that of a non-affected foreign observer. Little material, other than that written by a few black South African authors, has been written from the point-of-view of black South Africa. This paper attempts to present that view.

In so-doing, a certain bias will be seen to evolve in the course of the discussions. Although the material incorporated has been well-documented, an attempt still has been made to present this material in as objective a manner as possible. Nevertheless, the biased point-of-view of black South Africa cannot be eliminated.

In order to better understand the problems of the Republic of South Africa both sides, black as well as white, of the issues involved should be weighed. As previously stated, the white point-of-view is well-published--the black is not. It is precisely this point that is the avenue of departure for the research and why all biasness has not been deleted. The reader should therefore keep this in mind as he proceeds through the paper for its express purpose is to provide the counter-point side of an on-going dialogue, in order that both parties of the situation may be equally and then, hopefully, objectively assessed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to extend appreciation to Professor Brian Weinstein of Howard University, Washington, D.C. for his initial guidance and stimulation in the formulation of this research effort.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Major James Dorton, U.S. Army, my research advisor at the Defense Intelligence School. The time he took to read the draft and the valuable comments he offered resulted in many improvements to this paper. His encouragement, patience, and willingness to assist are greatly appreciated.

TABLE OF CONTENTS


	Page
PREFACE	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
LIST OF PLATES	ix
Chapter	
1. SOUTH AFRICA UNDER APARTHEID	1
DEVELOPMENTAL BACKGROUND	1
THE SYSTEM OF APARTHEID	4
Race Classification	5
Geographical Segregation	6
Migratory Labor and the Pass Laws	8
Labor	9
Trade Unions	10
The Right to Strike	10
Job Reservation	10
Employment Superiority	11
Wages	11
The Educational System	12
Religion	14
Repression	18
2. BLACK AFRICAN NATIONALISM	26
WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO RESISTANCE	39
AN ANALYSIS OF SUCCESS	41
CURRENT BLACK POLITICAL MOVEMENTS	44

	Page
The Black Peoples' Convention (BPC)	45
The South African Student Organization (SASO)	
The Success of the Movements	
3. SEPARATE TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT	53
SELF-GOVERNING AFRICAN AREAS	59
4. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY	70
ESTABLISHING THE ORGANIZATION	72
THE FRAMEWORK OF OAU SUPPORT	74
THE OAU AS A UNIFYING INSTRUMENT	77
OAU MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT	80
THE POSSIBILITY OF OAU DIRECT ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA	82
OAU DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES	83
AN ANALYSIS OF SUCCESS	84
5. BLACK LEADERSHIP	90
ALBERT JOHN MVUMBI LUTHULI	91
NELSON MANDELA	93
KAISER DALIWONGA MATAMBE	96
MANGOSUTHU GATSHA BUTHELESI	99
A COMPARISON OF LEADERSHIP	105
FUTURE BLACK LEADERSHIP: A SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	107
6. THE FUTURE OF MAJORITY RULE: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS	114
THE ROLE OF THE THIRD WORLD	114

	Page
THE ROLE OF THE SUPERPOWERS	115
THE ROLE OF INTERNAL FACTIONS	122
White South Africa	122
Black South Africa	126
A FINAL NOTE	129
APPENDICES	
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES	135
B. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA	143
ALBERT JOHN MVUMBI LUTHULI	143
NELSON MANDELA	147
KAISER DALIWONGA MATANZIMA	149
MANGOSUTHU GATSHA BUTHELEZI	150
C. APARTHEID: WHITE SOUTH AFRICAN BELIEFS	153
BIBLIOGRAPHY	160

LIST OF PLATES

PLATE	Page
I. MAP OF SOUTH AFRICA, CIRCA 1977	ix
II. SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH-WEST AFRICA RESERVES AND BORDER AREAS	60



Base 500449 1-72

PLATE I

Chapter 1

SOUTH AFRICA UNDER APARTHEID

The word "apartheid," from the Afrikaans language spoken by the descendants of the Dutch settlers in South Africa, literally means separation. The system of apartheid determines the conditions of life in South Africa. It has to be the ¹starting point for any discussion of that country.

The originally rural, Calvinistic Afrikaner² Nationalist Party, which won the South African general election of May 1948, "devised apartheid as a way to contain the African population in native reserves, except when they were [required] to serve white economic needs."³ Subsequently refined into separate development, apartheid⁴ provides black "homelands" to justify the continuing denial of meaningful political rights to blacks in white South Africa.

Developmental Background

Apartheid is omnipresent in South Africa, carrying with it socially and morally distasteful manifestations. However, one must search more deeply into the motivations behind its imposition in order to fully understand the reasons for its development. The European has been in a position of dominance from his first landing at the Cape, enjoying a privileged position in South Africa (see Appendix A for a historical perspective). He wishes to preserve his culture, country, and identity by keeping his people "inviolable from a mixing which would mean quick swamping

by the Bantu."⁴ The South African white, consequently, is defending what he believes to be his **natural right**. Dr. H. Mullen, former South African Ambassador to Great Britain, in reply to a critical article in a British newspaper, wrote:

In your criticism of South Africa you apply the comparatively stable standards and values of Britain, in particular, and of Europe, in general. South Africa is not of Europe; she is of Africa. And in formulating her policies she has to meet a situation shaped by the realities of her continent--a continent still in many respects in revolution.⁵

The Europeans have legitimate rights to the country--they built it with their own labors, fought and died for it, and have occupied it for as long or longer than the Bantu.⁶ The white South African, who has no other homeland, is concerned that unless he pursues his present course of action all will be lost to black African nationalism. He is presently outnumbered four-to-one by the non-white population, with the ratio increasing steadily in favor of the black peoples. The Tomlinson Commission has estimated that by the year 2000 there will be four-and-one-half as many blacks as whites.⁷ The majority of white South Africans are therefore concerned that a multi-racial state would be a black state in which the white man would be without rights and security. Dr. Verwoerd once stated:

In a South Africa which, in fifty years, will comprise 19 million natives as against six million whites, the fate of European civilization is threatened. We shall succeed only through our apartheid policy.⁸

The white South Africans have, however, continually

stressed development for the Bantu--but a separate development. General Smuts, in May 1917, stated:

A policy is developing in South Africa today which may have profound effects on the future of the continent. . . . We have got into the habit of giving to the natives their own separate institutions, which are parallel to ours. . . . Through this parallelism we shall solve a problem which otherwise would have been insolvable. . . . Each day we are more and more convinced that it is useless to try to govern white and black under the same system. . . . Their political institutions should be different, but always on the basis of self-government. . . . In our system of ownership of land, in the form of our administration, our policy consists of separating the races. . . . And so in the final analysis you will have in South Africa vast regions cultivated by blacks and governed by blacks. . . . And in the remainder of the country you will have whites governing themselves.

The belief that the Bantu must have the same freedoms and chance for development that is enjoyed by the whites was again reinforced by Mr. Strydom, when he stated:

The native must be allowed opportunities to develop. It is ridiculous to suppose that he can be kept down indefinitely by the Europeans. . . . Under apartheid, in his own areas, the native will be able to practice as a lawyer, or a doctor, or become a bricklayer or follow any lawful profession or calling he wishes and attain any position of which he is capable. If a native becomes qualified in one way or another and is allowed to live among Europeans but denied the opportunity of earning his living by the exercise of his attainments and by virtue of his qualifications--then that, I say, is oppression, wrong and unjust.¹⁰

The white South Africans express the belief that the Bantu cannot develop in an integrated society; that his traditions and mores are barriers too great to overcome; and that there is no great inconvenience in dual nationalism--one for white and one for non-white. But fear is the true catalyst--fear of engulfment, of black domination, of

4

expropriation, of cultural extinction, of anarchy and even of annihilation. Self-preservation is the primary motivating force, and all other "causes" of apartheid are merely contributory to the policy or used as justification of the policy.

As the white South Africans, and in particular the Afrikaners, are steeped in the traditions of Calvinism, the Dutch Reformed Church provided religious justification for this separation.

Afrikaners were a "chosen people" with a manifest destiny to rule South Africa. God had given the African his inferior position and it would be wrong for the Afrikaner race to hold out hope to the black man of improvement in his status.¹¹

Today, the churches no longer preach this doctrine-- that the blacks are the "sons of Ham," destined to serve as "hewers of wood and drawers of water," but the consequences of this primitive concept still influence the whites, particularly in the rural areas.

The System of Apartheid

The foundation of apartheid is the premise that all power must remain in the hands of the whites, which implies that all other peoples must be separated from the whites. In South Africa each person is classified by race, and each racial group is then segregated from each other as much as possible. Described as the "classic divide-and-rule strategy," these facts form the basis of apartheid as a legal system.¹²

Race classification. The color of an individual's skin governs every aspect of life in South Africa. Whites enjoy the greatest number of rights and privileges, while blacks enjoy the least. The South African government, in accordance with the Population Redistribution Act of 1950, recognizes four main racial groups:

African--person of African descent--15 million;
White--person of European descent--4 million;
Colored--person of racially-mixed descent--2 million;
Asian--person of Asian (almost entirely Indian)
descent--2/3 million.¹³

Final authority to decide an individual's race rests with the government-appointed Race Classification Board, made up entirely of whites. The classification is often arbitrary, relying primarily on "looks" and heritage.

The sign "White Only/Blankes Alleen",¹⁴ appears on park benches; at the entrances to post offices, railway stations, cinemas, theaters, libraries, museums, art galleries, zoos, and sports grounds; on bridges and beaches; on buses and trains; outside hospitals and clinics. Within buildings, private and public alike, it will invariably appear above at least one of the elevators.

Enforcement of racial separation is rigid, even to the point of breaking up families. As late as 1963 some Colored families in the Western Cape were being reclassified as white. In many cases, half of a family may be classified as white and the other half classified as Colored, which requires separate living areas with no social contact between the two. The Immorality and Mixed Marriages Acts of

1950 prohibit marriage, sexual relations, and acts of physical intimacy falling short of sexual intercourse, for example, kissing or fondling, between white and black.¹⁵ The sick are treated in separate hospitals or in strictly separated sections of the same hospital. Black victims of an accident may not be carried in the ambulance used for white victims; there are separate ambulances for white and black.

Norman Sklarewitz believes that conditions such as these and lack of freedom underlying the apartheid policies breed violence. He has noted that each race is told where it can reside although black live-in maids reside in white areas, and present laws forbid their husbands from staying overnight with them.¹⁶ Government inspectors have the right to enter any dwelling without notice to insure that the policies are being carried out.

Geographical Segregation. Physical separation of races is the most obvious apartheid principle in South Africa, applying to the land as well as the people. In accordance with the Group Areas Act of 1950, the country is divided into areas for whites and areas for blacks, the latter of which are known as "Bantustans" or homelands (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of the separate development of these homelands). Although Africans comprise approximately 70 per cent of the population, the government has reserved only 13 per cent of the land of South Africa for these so-called "Bantus," as

they are referred to by government officials.¹⁷ "Expanding on laws passed in 1913, the Nationalist Party government allows Africans to buy land only in the 13 per cent of the country covered by the [Bantustans],"¹⁸ even though the reserves contain few industries and no important sources of employment. Additionally, according to law, persons of one racial group are prohibited from occupying property in a controlled area of another group. There is strict residential separation of the groups in the towns. The Africans, Asians and coloreds are required to occupy townships or areas set aside for each group several miles from the town itself, which is reserved for exclusive occupation by whites.¹⁹ Areas of South Africa reserved for whites include all large cities, seaports, airfields, and mines, with no land being set aside for Asians or coloreds. Africans living on land reserved for whites are known as "black spots" by the government and, although they may have lived in these areas for generations, they, as well as the Asians and coloreds, are slowly being evicted. In February 1963, approximately 3,500 Africans were uprooted from the Bester-spruit area outside Vryheid and were moved to a tent camp at Mandblo, twenty miles away.²⁰ In May 1963, Pageview, an Indian trading area of fifty years standing, was declared a white area. This meant that 5,000 Indians had to move to Lenasia more than twenty miles away.²¹ There have been many more such cases of uprooting, involving large public expenditures, and creating serious hardships for the families

involved.

Two of the precepts behind the establishment of apartheid were to keep the Africans on the reserves and out of the cities, and to control as tightly as possible those who were drawn into the cities and mining compounds, that number currently being nearly a third of the country's 18 million Africans. Industrialization's demand for black labor largely defeated the first aim and is now "giving apartheid its gravest test."²² A permanent urban black population has grown up in the past three decades despite the most strenuous efforts of apartheid's planners, who required blacks to live in all-black housing compounds and then refused to sell them land in these compounds.

African housing goes to the heart of apartheid. In a reversal of standard economic laws, access to a house is the key to getting a job. However, the government has made it clear that Africans will never be allowed to buy the houses or the land on which the houses stand, because this is "white" land. Moreover, homesteading is visible defiance of apartheid's rapidly fading dictate that white South Africa would not have a permanent urban black population.

Migratory labor and the pass laws. By depriving Africans of the right to settle in certain areas and to own property, the government has created a massive pool of migratory labor. The physical separation of the races that permits

9

this migratory labor is enforced by a system of "pass laws." In 1952, the Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act replaced a former system of passes with reference books, in addition to providing identity cards for the entire non-white population. All Africans must carry a reference book on their person at all times. This book contains personal biographies, employment dates, tax receipts, and records of permits to travel or reside in a certain location. If an individual is found without a book, or if the information contained therein is out-of-date or missing, that individual is automatically arrested. "Hundreds of thousands of Africans are convicted every year and punished by fines, imprisonment, and strokes [verbal censure] for pass offenses."²³ The pass laws are the government's most obvious method of regulating population movements.

Labor. To "persuade" Africans to work for low wages, the South African government has done two things. First, it has imposed taxes on Africans which must be paid in cash, thus requiring Africans to work for cash wages rather than producing only that which is required for survival. And secondly, it has classified any African outside a Bantustan not working for a white as a vagrant liable for prosecution. Once an African worker with an established residence loses his job, he also loses his right to remain in the urban area. Under apartheid legislation, the pass laws regulate

the population movements to provide for the labor needs of South African mines and industries. The most important apartheid labor legislation includes the following:

Trade unions. Multi-racial trade unions were prohibited in 1956; successive laws now prevent African trade unions from exercising any rights. All details of such employment as working conditions and wages are controlled by the employers or by government committees.

The right to strike. White and colored workers have some rights to strike, but African workers are denied the right altogether. Africans who strike or participate in any work stoppage or slowdown face a three-year prison sentence and a fine of \$1500.

Job reservation. Labor laws, enacted as early as 1911, specifically reserve certain occupations for whites only. In 1956, the Industrial Conciliation Act provided for the reservation of certain occupations for particular racial groups. The situation is to keep skilled positions in general open for whites (see Figure 1).




Figure 1²⁴

In February 1963, a directive was issued by the South African government curbing any further expansion of African private enterprise in urban areas, with a view to transferring all African financial and trading concerns to the Bantustans.

Employment superiority. Under apartheid, no African may occupy a position senior to any white in a company, and Africans may never give orders to whites.

Wages. In the mining industry, white wages are approximately 16 times greater than wages of Africans; in manufacturing, white wages are approximately five times greater than those of Africans. South African whites have one of the highest living standards in the world, and yet Africans must struggle merely to subsist. The government has made no effort to enforce a minimum wage. The Minister of Labor has espoused the government's attitude, stating:

To plead that you must pay the natives who are employees a civilized wage means only one thing in this country--white wages. To want to pay white wages to natives fails in the first place to take account of their productivity; in the second place ^{it} does not take their living standard into account.²⁵

The Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1963, known as the Servants Act, limits the residence of African workers, including domestic servants. The Minister of Bantu Administration is authorized under the act to limit the number of live-in domestic servants to one per private residence or to forbid any African to remain within any white urban

area overnight. This plan affects 50,000 African servants in Johannesburg alone, requiring them to commute to their employment.

The educational system. Apartheid applied to education means that schooling for whites is free and compulsory until the age of 16, while educational opportunities are limited for blacks. The government of South Africa spends approximately nine times more per white pupil than for African pupil, and, unlike whites, Africans must pay even to attend public school. When, as a result of the Bantu Education Act of 1953, the Nationalist Party government placed all education of Africans under state control, the Minister of Education stated the following:

Education will be suitable for those who will become the industrial workers of the country. . . . What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when it cannot be used in practice? That is quite absurd. Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life.²⁶

In 1959, a separate Department of Bantu Education was established and placed under the Minister of State. This legislation was designed to reform education in accordance with apartheid policies, with the government maintaining that by training pupils in European ideals, the educational system created "vain hopes" that Africans could occupy particular positions in the community despite the policy of apartheid and, consequently, created frustration.²⁷ Subsequent to the legislation, separate schools were built for whites, Africans, Asians, and coloreds.

Apartheid was then extended into higher education, which divided the institutions on a racial and tribal basis, and removed colleges from the urban areas. Blacks get their higher education at ethnic colleges established for Asians and coloreds or, in the case of Africans, at the ethnic college the student is required to attend according to his official classification; that is, if he is classified as a Zulu, he must enroll at the University of Zululand, even if his home is in another part of the country.²⁸ Currently, the Minister of Education may decide which particular college will admit what particular ethnic groups.

Education triggered the violent racial confrontations of June 1976. "Once viewed as a gateway to advancement, when white and black schools taught the same subjects, the renamed and reorganized Bantu education has come to be seen as a vehicle of enslavement."²⁹ Denis Herbstein, in analyzing the causes of the rioting which occurred in Soweto, a township outside of Johannesburg, stressed that the immediate cause was the government ruling that African school children in "white" urban areas must be taught in both English and Afrikaans, "although every other group in South Africa has the right to choose its language of instruction."³⁰ Herbstein additionally pointed out that the pupils have become militant and constitute an elite since only one in fifty blacks enters high school. The objections to the instruction in Afrikaans are practical and emotional, as English is the main European language,

while Afrikaans is the language of the "white masters." In July 1976, the government rescinded its ruling that Afrikaans be used for teaching in black schools. It was unfortunate that it took to violent racial strife to bring it about.

The Bantu educational system is an overcrowded, poorly managed system in which "only seven out of every 1,000 African students who start primary school graduate from high school. Black parents have to pay for books, school fees, teacher pay raises and school construction costs" that the government pays for white parents.³¹ A further example of the mismanagement is the implementation by the government of a separate television channel for Africans, at a cost of 70 million Pounds, while African leaders almost unanimously wanted the money for education of blacks.

The Department of Bantu Education does, however, have a few achievements to its credit. By 1968, more schools had been built and many more children were at school than formerly. More educated Africans were able to find employment as clerks and secretaries of school boards; and the policy was introduced of making higher posts, such as that of sub-inspector, open to Africans.

Religion. Officially, the government may prevent Africans from attending services in a church where whites worship, or from participating in social activities arranged by a

church for its white and black members. As a result, religion is rapidly becoming a major focal point for dissension aimed at the system of apartheid.

There are almost twice as many whites in the Afrikaans churches as in all of the other Protestant churches put together. On the other hand, there are nine times as many Africans, and almost twice as many colored, in the other Protestant churches as there are in the Afrikaans churches. There are over 2,400 African separatist churches, and their numbers, as well as the numbers of adherents, fluctuates considerably. As a result, most of the churches have little stability. Some are established for reasons such as personal jealousies and ambitions, the temptation to make what seems to be a comparatively easy living, and dissatisfaction with the too irksome discipline of the white-controlled parent church. Others are founded from either a desire to adapt the Christian religion to primitive beliefs or an awakening nationalism that demands a separate and independent organization. The former are often the result of dissatisfaction with church discipline and are unlikely to live long; the latter are, in prevailing social and political circumstances, likely to attract increasing numbers of Africans who suffer from a sense of frustration.

Relations between the Afrikaans churches and other Christian communities suffered because of the cleavage between Afrikaner and English-speaking South Africans.

It is in theory and, to a lesser extent, in practice that race relations constitutes the greatest difference between the Afrikaans churches and the English-speaking churches. The Afrikaans churches are part of the Afrikaner people, and their attitudes and policies both form and are formed by those of the majority of the Afrikaner people. Though there are individual exceptions, the Afrikaans churches believe in separate congregations for different racial groups. They maintain that while it is the function of the church of the white-man, by missionary effort, to help Africans to establish their own separate churches, non-whites must not have membership or control in the affairs of the parent church. This is in line with the current governmental views, as the Afrikaans churches have expressed themselves strongly in favor of the Nationalist Party's apartheid policy.

"Fundamental to Afrikaner Calvinist thought is the doctrine of Divine Creation, the fall, and the redemption. Further, the state has been created by God, and exists independently of its citizens; its authority over the individual is ordained by God, and what distinguishes it from other Divine Creations is that it possesses a monopoly of might, of "the power of the sword." It is the duty of the state to organize this power internally and externally, by means of a police force and an army.³²

The English-speaking churches believe that while it may be politically expedient for white and black to worship in separate churches, they are all members of the same community and share in the government of the church.

Afrikaner politicians have been accustomed to

castigating the English-language churches for preaching against apartheid while practicing it in their own churches. This has compelled the churches to take stock of their position, only to find that this accusation is very largely true. The South African pattern that has been developed for all churches has been one of social separation. Insofar as the African members of the different churches are concerned, this is often a matter of practical expediency dictated by language differences and geographical separation, but that is not an argument that applies to the colored population. Yet, many English-language churches practice separation in church attendance, though not in synodical meetings. The attacks on the English-language churches and the visible results of apartheid have induced them to take an increasingly strong stand against it.

In August 1976, South African colored clergy, affiliated with the Dutch Reformed Church, issued a statement rejecting apartheid. In a second statement at the time, the clergy termed apartheid "sinful" and stated they would no longer accept privileges such as home ownership not afforded blacks in the nation. This was accompanied by a resolution which stated the church and state must not prevent racially mixed marriages. These and other church leaders are under pressure from student groups who are threatening to destroy churches unless action is taken by the churches.³³

In response to the South African government's

condemnation of Catholic schools which admitted non-white students in January of this year, Father Dominic Sibolten, spokesman for the South African Catholic Bishops Conference, pledged that the church would continue with integration regardless of the government's actions. He stated, "we are no longer free to tolerate a situation that fosters discrimination. . . . The present situation in South Africa will not permit a move against the church."³⁴

The growing dispute between the Roman Catholic Church and the South African government reached crisis level in February of this year, as the church announced plans to implement a program to integrate and improve conditions for South Africa's non-whites. The Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference announced that it "will fully integrate all churches, convents and other institutions under church control, appoint black priests to white parishes, introduce equal pay for equal work in Dioces and boycott businesses that discriminate against blacks."³⁵ In calling for equal power sharing by the white minority and black majority, the Catholic policy has been termed "the most significant move for change by a major organization in the country in recent history."³⁶

Repression. Maintaining apartheid connotes government by violence. Numerous massacres of Africans have occurred in South Africa, along with a number of political assassinations. As the international community looked on in 1960, the now

infamous Sharpsville massacre brought to the forefront of world politics the potential brutality of maintaining apartheid.

The South African military organizations are the ultimate enforcers of the apartheid policies. A former Minister of Defense made this quite clear when he stated, "do not think we are arming to fight a foreign enemy, we are not. We are arming to shoot down the black masses."³⁷

The black opposition to the apartheid laws has been met by the government with a number of increasingly repressive laws used to cease all activity that aims to change the existing system. The cumulative effort of these laws and the way in which they are administered is to make a mockery of South Africa's claim that its system is based on the rule of law. While there is an independent judiciary that is appointed and functions superficially according to recognized Western standards, in fact, the court's powers, particularly in the case of Africans, to promote justice and remedy injustice are severely limited. Because of the array of laws granting to policemen and other officials widespread powers of arrest, detention, search, and interrogation, the area within which the courts are permitted to reach an independent decision is greatly circumscribed.

The laws which give the police these wide powers are known as the "Repression Legislation," denying to all citizens their fundamental human rights. The two most prominent of these laws are the Internal Security Act and the General

Law Amendment Act, both of which permit police to hold suspects without charges, incommunicado, for seven to 14 days. While suspects charged with robbery, rape or even murder are routinely granted access to lawyers and the chance to argue for bail, these rights are routinely denied to political prisoners. Only government-employed magistrates visit them during the interrogation phase.³⁸

The government has outlawed freedom of speech and of assembly, and has provided for punishment without trial. There is strict censorship of books and films. Thousands of books--many of them accepted as literature in the Western world--are banned. Grounds for prohibition are never furnished, but the general policy appears to be to exclude all material either critical of apartheid or approving of interracial association, particularly sex relations between white and black. Weekly newspapers and magazines have been banned. The Liberal Party newspaper Contact and the anti-apartheid magazine The New Africa were harassed out of existence by prosecution under emergency regulations and the requirement of large cash deposits as a prerequisite to continued publication. In addition, the publication, in any form, of the writings of many South Africans now abroad is prohibited by law.

The denial or withdrawal of a passport is one of the indirect methods used to curb dissent. South Africans in the country know that criticism of government policies will imperil their chances of obtaining a passport and may

result in the withdrawal of a passport already issued; those abroad have every reason to fear that such criticism will have a similar result. An African seeking a passport must deposit with his application \$240 if he is traveling to Europe, and \$480 if he is traveling to the United States. He must also produce recommendations from two persons of "standing" and a report from the appropriate local authority testifying to his good character and stating that "he is considered a fit and proper person to visit countries where there is no racial segregation."³⁹

The government may refuse a passport but grant the applicant an exit permit. This enables him to leave the country but subject to the condition that he will never return. The holder of an exit permit who returns to South Africa is guilty of a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment and removal from the country after he has served his sentence.

The Suppression of Communism Act allows the Prime Minister to designate any person as a communist, and therefore to compel that individual to resign from all societies and organizations; furthermore, he can forbid any person to speak publicly or to enter certain areas. In the legislative and judicial policies of the government, this act has been extended to cover any opposition to apartheid or the existing Nationalist Party government. Consequently, opponents of apartheid are often branded as communists and treated accordingly.⁴⁰

Within South Africa, the activities of the Special Branch of the Police and the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) are reinforced by a continuing process of discouraging dissent. BOSS, a domestic intelligence agency answerable only to Prime Minister Vorster, who controls it directly, was created in 1969. The Bureau has helped add a distinctively Machiavellian and manipulative gloss to the once straight-forward rule of South Africa.⁴¹ Other governmental organs use a variety of methods to control free expression of opinion and to intimidate opponents of apartheid.

Throughout the history of South Africa, apartheid has been more and more harshly enforced. For example, South Africa accounts for nearly half the executions carried out in the entire world.⁴² The government has responded to popular pressure and protest only by enacting even more repressive measures. As a result, the government today has wide control over all South Africans, black and white. A black leader recently stated, "the military, economic and political power is all in white hands. . . . It fills you with despair until you realize that it all rests on the black labor force. Will they shoot the labor force that makes this country work?"⁴³

The violent rioting of June 1976 in Soweto, described as the "worst upheavals in the nation's history,"⁴⁴ provides a stark reminder of the seriousness of the measures of control. In a television and radio speech at the time

of the rioting, South African Prime Minister Vorster declared "the government will not be intimidated. . . . Instructions have been given to maintain law and order at all costs."⁴⁵

CHAPTER 1 NOTES

¹Thomas Patrick Melady, The White Man's Future in Black Africa (New York: MacFadden-Bartell Corporation, 1962), p. 141.

²An Afrikaner is any white man of non-British descent whose principal language is Afrikaans. Afrikaners are composed primarily of Dutch, Flemish, French Huguenot, or German stock. They do not consider themselves Dutchmen, Netherlanders, or Hollanders and, except for religion, there is no direct bond to their mother countries. The Afrikaners today are chiefly an urban population; very few still engage in farming.

³Jim Hoagland, "New Era of Black Defiance Jolts Afrikaner Complacency," Washington Post, January 9, 1977, p. A16, col. 2.

⁴Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 108. In the first volume of the definitive Afrikaans dictionary published by the government of South Africa in 1950, apartheid is defined as:

A political policy in South Africa based on the broad principles of (a) differentiation according to differences of race and/or color and/or level of civilization, as opposed to assimilation; (b) the maintenance and perpetuation of the separate identity of the different color groups which the population comprises and the separate development of these groups according to their own nature, tradition and aptitude, as opposed to segregation. In its practical application the policy comprises regulations which include, inter alia, measures designed to achieve a degree of merely local separation e.g. in respect of residence, public accommodation, transportation, entertainment, etc.; measures concerning political rights, e.g. separate voters' rolls, separate representation in Parliament and Provincial Councils; further territorial segregation e.g. the setting aside of comparatively large areas for the exclusive use of one population group e.g. the native reserves.

⁵"South Africa," African Digest, October, 1962, p. 66.

⁶The word Bantu means "many people" and is a collective term. The Bantu do not form a homogeneous mass except on the basis of color. They are a copper-skinned people who inhabit east and south Africa constituting a number of nations distinct from one another on language, history, and culture. The principle nations are: Kwazulu, Xhosa, Northern Sotho, Southern Sotho, Tswana, Tsonga Venda, Basuto, and Swazi.

⁷"Apartheid in the Union of South Africa," International Review Service, Vol. VI, No. 57 (1960), p. 5.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Paul Giniewski, The Two Faces of Apartheid (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965), p. 122.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, Apartheid (Cape Town, South Africa: National Commercial Printers, Ltd., 1960), p. 19.

¹²The Africa Research Group, Race to Power: The Struggle for Southern Africa (New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 5.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴The sign, like all other notices, usually appears in both official languages--Afrikaans and English.

¹⁵Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁶Norman Sklarewitz, Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1976, p. 3.

¹⁷Africa Research Group, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁸Jim Hoagland, "The New Black: Educated, Frustrated," Washington Post, January 10, 1977, p. A16, col. 3.

¹⁹Rubin and Weinstein, loc. cit.

²⁰U.N. General Assembly, 18th Session, Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the

Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5497, September 16, 1963), p. 59

²¹Ibid., p. 61.

²²Jim Hoagland, "The New Black: Educated, Frustrated," op. cit., p. A16, col. 2.

²³U.N. General Assembly, op. cit., p. 71.

²⁴Africa Research Group, op. cit., p. 24.

²⁵Ibid., p. 27.

²⁶Ibid., p. 28.

²⁷Philip W. Quigg, "South African Problems and Prospects," Africa Report, January, 1965, p. 11.

²⁸Rubin and Weinstein, loc. cit.

²⁹Jim Hoagland, "The New Black: Educated, Frustrated," op. cit., p. A16, col. 4.

³⁰Denis Herstein, Manchester Guardian, June 27, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

³¹Jim Hoagland, "The New Black: Educated, Frustrated," op. cit., p. A16, col. 4.

³²Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 226.

³³Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, Eastern ed., August 18, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

³⁴Robin Wright, "South African Parliament: No Major Initiatives," Washington Post, January 22, 1977, p. A7, col. 6.

³⁵Robin Wright, "South Africa's Catholics to Integrate," Washington Post, February 12, 1977, p. A1, col. 1.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Africa Research Group, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

³⁸Jim Hoagland, "Police: Feared Guardians of White Privilege," Washington Post, January 14, 1977, p. A12, col. 3.

³⁹Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 121.

⁴⁰Alan Paton, Hope for South Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958), p. 42.

⁴¹Jim Hoagland, "Police: Feared Guardians of White Privilege," op. cit., p. A12, col. 5.

⁴²Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 120.

⁴³Jim Hoagland, "South Africa: How Many Blacks Are Whites Ready to Kill?," Washington Post, January 16, 1977, p. A25, col. 2.

⁴⁴Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., June 19, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

⁴⁵Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., June 20, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Chapter 2

BLACK AFRICAN NATIONALISM

Oppositions to a caste system vary in scope, in objective and in method. In scope, an opposition may be national or sectional. A national opposition, in the fullest sense, derives support not only from all the castes but also from all the major classes within each caste. In objective, an opposition may be reformist or revolutionary. . . . A revolutionary opposition may confine itself to nonviolent methods for advancing its purposes--such as strikes and passive resistance to caste laws and customs--or it may resort to organized violence.¹

During the past sixty years there have been three main phases in the opposition to the caste system in South Africa. For a long while the principal opposition was sectional in scope, being limited to elite groups in each caste, reformist in objective, and nonviolent in method. Between 1948 and 1960, while remaining nonviolent, opposition became revolutionary in objective and national in scope. Since 1960 the principal opposition has been an underground and essentially African movement, pursuing revolutionary goals by violent as well as nonviolent means. This discussion will essentially focus on the years 1948 to the present, wherein the opposition was, in effect, national.

Up to May 1948, all the governments of South Africa maintained far-reaching legal discriminations against Africans in the white areas, and no white political organization existed which presented a clear-cut challenge to the system. The white liberals were undecided when it

came to establishing policies. Continuously preoccupied with the business of trying to destroy the effects and to expose the fallacies of the existing system, they failed to create a picture of their ultimate goals for South Africa or to show how radical reforms might be realized.²

Political activity among the subordinate castes began toward the end of the 19th Century. Before 1948 the principal organizations were the African National Congress (ANC), black Africa's oldest political party, being founded in 1912, the South African Indian Congress, founded in 1920, and the African Political Organization.³ All three organizations comprised small groups of Western-oriented middle-class elements and lacked mass support. Their purpose was to realize the promise inherent in the Cape liberal tradition, first, by gaining full equality with whites for the non-white middle classes which they represented and, later, by extending the benefits of equality to the masses of people. The precedent they had in mind was the step-by-step extension of the parliamentary franchise to all classes and both sexes as in Britain.⁴ By rational argument and pressure within the framework of the constitution supporters of these organizations sought to persuade the existing electorate to reverse the segregationist tide. Throughout this period the African National Congress remained under the control of lawyers, clergy and journalists and had the professed objectives of educating the white electorate concerning "the requirements and aspirations of the native

people," enlisting the support of sympathetic white organizations, promoting unity among all African peoples and, above all, redressing African grievances "by constitutional means."⁵ The ANC adhered scrupulously to these objectives.

By 1948 it was clear that this type of opposition was futile. Instead of being admitted to equality, the non-white middle classes were being subjected to additional forms of discrimination. All the reformist opposition had achieved was a succession of rearguard actions, each ending in defeat.

The origins of a firmer policy in the principal non-white organizations may be traced to the war years, when a new generation of African intellectuals began to lose patience with the established leadership and to form a pressure group within the ANC.⁶ The core of the group was four Africans who were working in Johannesburg: Anton Lembebe from Natal; Walter Sisulu from the Transkei; Oliver Tambo from Pondoland; and Nelson Mandela, also from the Transkei. Forming a Youth League in 1944, these men gained control of the ANC in 1949 when the National Conference adopted their Program of Action. This program included the use of strikes, civil disobedience, and non-cooperation to coerce the government to remove discriminatory laws.⁷ At the same time Walter Sisulu was elected as Secretary-General of the ANC, and the President-General, Dr. A. B. Xuma, was replaced by Dr. J. S. Moroka. In 1952 the group came to the conclusion that Moroka was not the dynamic leader

they were looking for and it succeeded him with Albert J. Luthuli from Natal.⁸

The first systematic campaign against the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, known as the "Defiance Campaign Against Unjust Laws," was undertaken by the African and Indian congresses in concert in 1952.⁹ During the campaign, large numbers of volunteers went out of their way to defy discriminatory laws. These actions resulted in some eight thousand arrests. By the end of the year, rioting had occurred in Port Elizabeth, East London, Cape Town and Johannesburg. Such acts of violence were contrary to the intentions of the organizers and the campaign was terminated in 1953 when Parliament enacted severe penalties for protest actions. Parliament's actions were in the form of the Criminal Laws Amendment Act and the Public Safety Act.¹⁰ As the ANC leaders understood the situation, they regarded non-racism as the most effective means of responding to white racial arrogance. Their motives for the campaign had thus been threefold. First, the interracial cooperation of the campaign helped to publicise the non-racial aspirations of the ANC and its allies. Second, in the early days of the ANC revival, the campaign served to attract attention to the existence and activity of the ANC and to encourage recruiting. Third, it was considered desirable to demonstrate that racial discrimination really did affect every South African at every point of his or her life and to demonstrate this before a world audience.

In that final respect the campaign was considered to be extremely successful.¹¹

The next major campaign was almost national in scope. The African National Congress, the South African Indian Congress, the South African Colored Peoples' Organization, the predominantly white Congress of Democrats and the multi-racial South African Congress of Trade Unions cooperated in a campaign designed to enlist the support of the non-white masses and the sympathy of the outside world. Throughout the country, local groups compiled lists of grievances and elected delegates to a "congress of the People." On June 26, 1955, three thousand delegates met near Johannesburg and adopted a "freedom Charter."¹²

The government responded by enacting further repressive legislation and, in December 1956, by arresting 156 persons, including the leaders of the organizations forming the Congress alliance. The government charged them with high treason in that the Congress was a form of conspiracy designed to overthrow the state by violence and replace it with a state based on Communism.¹³

The failure of both the passive resistance campaign of 1952-1953 and the "Congress of the People" campaign of 1955-1956 led to new divisions within the ANC. There were those who agreed with Luthuli, Sisulu and Mandela that the Congress should continue to cooperate with other bodies and confine itself to nonviolent methods. Others contended that the alliance with the Indian, Colored and white

congresses had weakened and distracted the ANC and that there were excessive communist influences in each of the congresses. What was needed, they believed, was "a pure African movement, dedicated simply and solely to the emancipation of the African majority of the population of South Africa by whatever means necessary."¹⁴ Failing to obtain control of the ANC, the more radical group seceded in 1959 and founded the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The PAC leaders were younger and more aggressive than the ANC leaders. The President of the PAC was Robert Subukwe from the Eastern Cape Province, and the Secretary was Potlako Leballo from the Orange Free State.¹⁵

Attempting to keep the initiative, the ANC planned a new campaign. This campaign was to have started at the end of March 1960. However, the PAC forestalled the ANC by taking the first step in the national campaign on March 21, 1960. On that day large numbers of Africans presented themselves at police stations in different parts of the country without passes, inviting arrest, in the hope of clogging the machinery of justice and causing a labor dislocation. At the police station at Sharpville, near Johannesburg, the police resorted to shooting at such a crowd of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators, killing 69 Africans and wounding 178.¹⁶ "Women and children were among the dead and wounded, and it was established that a high percentage of the victims were shot in the back while running away."¹⁷

The government struck back fiercely: it declared a state of emergency; mobilized the armed forces, including the reserves; outlawed the ANC and the PAC; and arrested 98 whites, 36 coloreds, 90 Asians, and 11,279 Africans under emergency regulations. Furthermore, it jailed another 6,800 Africans for pass and other offenses, while the police beat up hundreds of Africans and compelled them to return to work.¹⁸ Subsequently, the PAC leaders were sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine. These measures broke the campaign, and deprived Africans of their last means of lawful opposition to the South African political system and engendered in many hearts a hatred which had not previously existed.¹⁹

After 1960, three main underground revolutionary movements emerged in South Africa. One, the Spear of the Nation (Umkonto we Sizwe), was an offshoot of the ANC; another, Pogo (pure, or only), was an offshoot of the PAC; and the third, the African Resistance Movement, was a multi-racial organization, consisting mainly of young white professional men and students.²⁰

The Spear of the Nation, founded by Nelson Mandela and other former ANC leaders in November 1961, was formed to disrupt communications and power lines and destroy government offices. This organization hoped that public order would thus gradually collapse; guerrilla warfare would begin and white supremacy would be overthrown. Pogo, founded at about the same time by former members of the

PAC, appeared to have planned mass killings of whites and the abrupt termination of white supremacy in 1963. The African Resistance Movement became active in 1963, when it committed acts of violence in the hope of frightening the government into making concessions.²¹

During a three-year period starting in December 1961, there were over two hundred acts of sabotage in South Africa. Until 1963, most of these acts were probably committed by members of the Spear of the Nation, while in 1964 most may be attributed to members of the African Resistance Movement. The government responded to these acts of violence by banning the Spear of the Nation, Pogo and the African Resistance Movement, and by conducting further large-scale arrests. Furthermore, it enacted still more repressive legislation, notably the General Law Amendment Act of 1962. This legislation provided for either the death penalty or a minimum five-year sentence for a number of offenses classified as sabotage. Pogo was broken by mid-1963; the collapse of the Spear of the Nation was hastened by the capture of Mandela and a handful of other leaders in Rivonia in 1962; and most of the saboteurs of the African Resistance Movement were arrested in July and August 1964.²² Nearly all who evaded arrest or escaped from detention fled the country, with the result that by the end of 1964 scarcely any active revolutionaries remained at large within the Republic. Though both the ANC and the PAC continued to have members within the country, renegade

guerrilla groups established organizational bases outside South Africa (in Ethiopia, Dar-es-Salaam, and Lusaka), from which guerrilla movements have been launched against the government.²³ During the middle 1960s, there was no direct guerrilla penetration of the Republic. However, at this time the African nationalist parties were recruiting fighters and sending them out of the country to the bases for training.

One of the difficulties encountered by the South African guerrilla bands was that their camps were hundreds of miles away from the borders of South Africa and large tracts of hostile territory had to be crossed before reaching the Republic. The nationalist leaders were presented with the problem of having an increasing number of trained guerrilla fighters waiting in their camps with little prospect of a direct attack on South Africa itself.

One of the South African government's prime fears was that the guerrillas might link up with and rejuvenate the remnants of the internal resistance movements. Both the ANC and the PAC hoped to achieve this, but while the ANC was prepared to combine with other groups in fighting outside South Africa, the PAC believed that they should concentrate immediately on penetrating into South Africa. Fewer PAC members had fled the Republic in the exodus and so its chances of rejuvenating internal activity seemed better than the ANC's. Yet, the problem of the guerrilla fighters being hundreds of miles away from the Republic

remained. At least one of the bands that attempted the hazardous journey met with disaster when, in June 1968, Portuguese forces intercepted and destroyed a PAC unit deep in Mozambique on its way to South Africa.²⁴

To counter these threats and to have further authority to deal directly with guerrilla activities, the government introduced the Terrorism Act in 1967. When the Minister of Justice introduced the new legislation he admitted that it gave the government far-reaching powers, but said he felt he had no reason to make excuses for that. Three years later, in 1970, Mr. P. C. Felser, the Minister of Justice, repeated that no excuses were required because South Africa was fighting cunning and ruthless men who had been trained to lie and resist interrogation, and that such men were planning a racial war for all of Southern Africa. There was, he estimated, a fully trained guerrilla manpower pool of 38,000 to 42,000 personnel in camps in Zambia and Tanzania, with others in the "pipeline" being trained not only in Africa but in China, Cuba and the Soviet Union.²⁵

Numerous difficulties have been faced by the guerrillas. Much of the southern African terrain is unsuitable for tactics which have been used in other guerrilla wars. Most of the countryside is open, with few hideaway areas. The rural population is also too scattered for the guerrillas to lose themselves in a mass of people. In addition, the external support for the nationalist movements was not always appropriate or consistent, and serious internal

squabbles developed inside the movements. By 1968, the morale of the guerrillas had fallen sharply.

At present, all overt opposition to apartheid appears to have been stamped out. Most of the important leaders of the resistance have been tracked down. Some are serving life sentences on Robben Island. Others are rendered impotent by ban, house arrest, or banishment from the country; and the rest have fled the country voluntarily.²⁶

By the very nature of its responses, however, the government has ensured that underground resistance will continue. With every door to negotiated change slammed in their faces, the Africans are left with no alternative but violence. In August 1970, an explosion in the heart of Johannesburg released a number of anti-apartheid leaflets bearing the name of the outlawed ANC. No damage was done, and scattering leaflets cannot be classed as dangerous revolutionary activity. Still, the obviously-implied message to the police, the government, and many perceptive whites could hardly have been missed. Regardless of widespread ruthless repression, the forces of clandestine resistance are still at least capable of obtaining explosives and are not yet sufficiently intimidated to be afraid to use them in a planned operation designed to let the African people know that resistance is not altogether dead. More important still, it had been decided to use explosives to scatter leaflets; but once explosive material is combined with the willingness and courage to use it, it can

just as easily be used to destroy property or people."²⁷

A quite different kind of threat to the apartheid structure is the constant risk in the large cities of spontaneous outbursts of violence by Africans. This has occurred more than once as when the grossly over-crowded trains bringing African workers into Johannesburg from the townships have been involved in collisions resulting in death and injury to passengers. On one occasion, the white engine driver was killed by a mob of infuriated passengers. On another occasion, the police were able to control a similar mob, intent on avenging the deaths of some of their friends, only by the use of large, heavily armed forces and fierce dogs.²⁸

Nicholas Ashford, in reporting from South Africa on the June 1976 violence in Soweto over the forced instruction of blacks in Afrikaans, stated:

Blacks are increasingly bitter over superficial changes in government policy on apartheid, with anti-white belligerency being strong among young people. This mood was summed-up by Dr. Melville Edelstein in his book What Do Young Africans Think?²⁹

Dr. Edelstein was a white official who was battered to death at the start of the June rioting.

White South African Response to Resistance

The South African government has responded to the guerrilla threat by taking steps both within the country and beyond its borders. Within the country, there has been an enormous increase in the military forces and an extension

of the police-state apparatus. The entire white male population, through a one-year compulsory training period and subsequent nine-year reserve training period, is equipped to be a militia which can be quickly mobilized. In extending the police-state apparatus, the government enacted the Terrorism Act which was retroactive and added to the already wide powers of detention without trial vested in the police. This act has been used to arrest, detain, torture, arraign for trial, and ultimately convict and sentence to imprisonment numerous guerrillas.³⁰

South Africa has developed a broad strategy in relation to independent black Africa "that is designed (1) to minimize the danger of guerrilla activity on its borders, and (2) to build good relations between the independent African states and South Africa, or at least to reduce their active hostility."³¹ In the case of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland (particularly vulnerable for geographic and economic reasons), the result has been a reasonable certainty that these countries will not offer any support or encouragement to guerrilla activity directed against South Africa. Subsequential financial assistance to Malawi and the encouragement of increased trade with other countries are tending to ensure that those countries will not support the call of the Organization of African Unity for action against apartheid.

South African propaganda presents apartheid as a sincere and genuine program of social development intended

to provide all blacks with complete freedom in their own areas. A generously financed and efficient propaganda machine pours out a flood of information through the South African embassies and the Information Service of South Africa. Radio South Africa, the short-wave external service of the South African Broadcasting Corporation, plays an important part in the dissemination of propaganda directed specifically to the countries of Africa. Using powerful transmitters, it devotes many hours a week to a program called "The Voice of South Africa," which is broadcast in nine languages and intended for Africa as a whole. A common theme in the propaganda of Radio South Africa is the advantage to be gained by the countries of Africa from good relations with the Republic.³²

An analysis of Success

Despite the government's attempt to isolate Africans in South Africa, the ANC had many things in common with movements elsewhere in Africa. As Mary Benson has noted:

Its structure had the same chain of authority from central executives to branches and party members, with the still larger body of sympathizers who attended mass meetings and who felt themselves part of the movement even if not formally members. It also had its working committee discussing major questions of policy and meeting frequently. It had the women's section, and the youth covering a wide age-range and tending to independent action and radicalism. Trade union activity, however, remained separate, with certain ANC members also working in various unions. It also had developed from an elite party of middle-class intellectuals to a mass party. In doing so it had acquired symbols such as the thumbs-up sign and slogans like "Mayibuye." The flag, the blouses the women wore, the caps the men wore, the folk songs, the hymns and

prayers, all these could be found from West Africa to East Africa to the North. There was pride too in "prison graduates." Conferences also--with the ritual from the opening anthem through fraternal greetings, executive reports and long discussions, to slogans, songs and public celebrations. One important weakness of the ANC compared with many organizations in Africa was its failure to maintain its newspaper.³³

Two vital factors comprised much of the difference between the situation in other parts of Africa, where nationalism triumphed, and South Africa. One was the large, long-settled white population together with the mainly apolitical Asian and colored populations which altogether numbered half the African population. The other factor was that in South Africa the white government controlled a heavily-armed, highly-industrialized state.³⁴

In consonance with these factors was the fact that though the ANC and parties in West Africa had similar organizational problems, in South Africa these were compounded by the forces of the laws and police. In South Africa freedom of movement had not only been severely restricted for decades by the pass laws, but movement and freedom to meet and to organize were restricted by the Urban Areas Act, the Native Administration Act, and the Suppression of Communism Act.³⁵

However, unlike the other nationalist movements, the rise of young black consciousness movements, involving students and other young urban black activists, is drawing more concern from the South African government. Manifested in "Black Power, South African-style, it is a tentative,

angry and young experience."³⁶ Thus far it has proven to be no match for the guns and economic pressures that the government uses in an effort to destroy it. However, it is no longer passive. A spontaneous student rebellion has sparked a wider psychological revolt within the black majority against the labels and status of inferiority pinned to blacks for more than a century. An educated new generation is redefining "blackness" and its position in South Africa. Racial pride and consciousness are being forged out of the very same white ideology that was intended to destroy them. The development of a racial counter-ideology to apartheid among young blacks is a serious and perhaps fatal blow to the fading ideal of liberals on both sides of the color line of a multi-racial society in which blacks and whites share power and work together to end apartheid.

The student leaders who remain behind have come to the conclusion that armed struggle is the only way for them to break apartheid. Seemingly providing justification for their conclusion, their movements have already produced some changes. The government has been forced to alter its education plan. At another level, whites are increasingly dropping the word "Bantu" from their vocabularies and speaking of the majority as "blacks."

Yet, the outcome of their struggle is highly uncertain, as the police continues to suppress even discussion of black aspirations in South Africa.

Current Black Political Movements

Since the banning of the African political organizations in the early 1960s new political parties have been established by Africans who wished to utilize the homeland governments as political platforms, and by those who wished to oppose all aspects of South African government policy. New non-political organizations have come into being, while others continue to function following the aftermath of the Defiance Campaign.³⁷ Whereas the majority of political organizations are homeland-based parties, the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC) and the South African Student Organization (SASO), both based on the black consciousness movement, are national organizations in all respects. Therefore, this discussion will focus on these two organizations.

The main stimulus for the formation of these two new organizations was, as in the past, a reaction against white minority rule of South Africa. Their formation was made possible by the increasing tide of black consciousness among blacks who saw no future for themselves in the homelands by virtue of the permanent necessity for them to earn a living in the white areas. Their overriding objectives of black unity and self-realization in various fields led them to realize that they would only succeed if their activities permeated to all levels of black society. As a result, they were the first political organizations in South African history consistently to employ voluntary

associations to build a following and achieve their objectives. The secularization of African life is thus an important requisite for their success. Little has resulted to date from their initial attempts to extend into usual tribal areas where traditional social structures remain fairly strong.

The Black Peoples' Convention (BPC). Unlike the political parties in the homelands, the BPC has no intention of availing itself of any opportunity for political expression through the structures of separate development. In this light, the BPC considers homeland political parties, such as those within the Transkei and Bophuthatswana, to be collaborationist (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of separate territorial development). Black unity and solidarity under the banner of black consciousness is its prime objective. The BPC considers that it arose from a need for a national political movement which would concentrate on self-help development efforts. The BPC also arose from a conviction among leading members that it was impossible to "liberate" themselves and their people when cooperating with those who were the "oppressors" through the separate development of the homelands and related policies. The meeting that led to its establishment was held in April 1971 at Bloemfontein.³⁸ The main decisions reached were: the formation of an organization which would cooperate with other black groups in order to realize black aspirations; there would,

however, be no cooperation with South African government policy and institutions although contact would be maintained with well-oriented blacks inside the system. The objectives of the organization would be the representation of African political opinion and the promotion of community development programs in the field of education, economic and cultural development.³⁹ In a press statement issued in January 1972, it was declared by the Convention that an ad hoc committee was working toward the formation of a political movement whose primary aim was to unite the black people with a view to their psychological and physical liberation.⁴⁰

The South African Student Organization (SASO). SASO arose from a belief among black students that it was futile to cooperate with white students within a single organization. SASO was formed in July 1969, at a conference in Turfloop, by the black membership of the University Christian Movement (UCM), a multi-racial inter-denominational organization founded in 1967 for African students.⁴¹ SASO became a member of the Southern African Students' Union, one of four provincial bodies of the All-Africa Students' Union formed in Ghana in 1971.⁴² The belief expressed in the SASO constitution, is that the black students in South Africa have unique problems and aspirations, and to satisfy them requires consolidated effort and a reassertion of pride and group identity. SASO therefore aims at promoting contact and cooperation among black students, in order to represent

them nationally and internationally.

The success of the movements. It is interesting to note that, while drawing world opinion and interest to the plight of the black people in South Africa, the efforts of the BPC and SASO have been relatively futile with respect to internal pressures brought against the South African government. Refusing to negotiate within the confines of separate development and using the political framework established within the system of apartheid, these organizations have reverted to the status of sounding-boards for the views of the African people, manifested in black consciousness.

Black students, however, while not operating in affiliation with SASO, have started a psychological revolution, dramatically transforming the once servile and politically dormant black majority that silently acquiesced to the walls of apartheid around black aspirations.

Student demonstrations, transformed into angry racial confrontations by police gunfire, "have ignited a sense of black pride and nationalism that has been silently building behind apartheid's walls since the beginning of the decade."⁴³ Black editor Perry Qoboza added to this, "the students showed us we had no right to feel helpless, to despair and give up."⁴⁴ "We're finished looking at ourselves as victims and looking up to the white man for concessions," asserts the Reverend Manas Buthelezi, adding, "the students aren't asking for the hurts of the

system to be softened, like their parents were six years ago. They're saying the system has to go."⁴⁵ A student activist has put it more simply: "It is our land. We want our land back."⁴⁶

As the white administration withdrew from Soweto and other black and mixed-race townships around the country to escape black violence, the students took effective control of the towns away from government-sanctioned black teachers, city councilmen, and functionaries. They established networks of information between schools, reaching out into the country-side.

Reverend Manas Buthelezi, who has been close to the young founders of the Black Consciousness Movement, virtually all of whom are in jail or banned from speaking publicly on the threat of jail, has stated that "black consciousness in South Africa grew from inside apartheid."⁴⁷

In what has been described as "the most important political trial ever held in South Africa,"⁴⁸ the government sentenced nine of the Black Consciousness Movement's leaders in December 1976 to prison terms ranging from five to ten years. Many of the students, however, have escaped to Botswana and Swaziland. There, many of them have been contacted by the outlawed African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress about undergoing guerrilla training. Ironically, many of these students are refusing to join either the ANC or the PAC, and are instead embracing the South African Student Organization and therefore the

South African student movement.⁴⁹

CHAPTER 2 NOTES

¹Leonard M. Thompson, The Republic of South Africa (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 164.

²Ibid., p. 167.

³Mary Benson, The African Patriots: The Story of the African National Congress of South Africa (London: Faber, 1963), pp. 123-125.

⁴Thompson, op. cit., p. 168.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Benson, op. cit., p. 129.

⁷Donald Denoon, Southern Africa Since 1800 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 186.

⁸Thompson, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

⁹Denoon, op. cit., p. 187.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 189.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Thompson, op. cit., p. 177.

¹³Ibid., p. 178.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁶Benson, op. cit., p. 148.

¹⁷Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 123.

¹⁸Thompson, op. cit., pp. 179-180.

- ¹⁹Benson, op. cit., pp. 146-150.
- ²⁰Thompson, op. cit., p. 180.
- ²¹Ibid., pp. 180-181.
- ²²Ibid., pp. 182-193.
- ²³Denoon, op. cit., p. 193.
- ²⁴Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 102.
- ²⁵Southern Africa, September 19, 1970, p. 158.
- ²⁶Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., pp. 123-124.
- ²⁷Ibid.
- ²⁸Ibid.
- ²⁹Editorial, The Times [London], June 18, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.
- ³⁰Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 125.
- ³¹Ibid.
- ³²Ibid., p. 126.
- ³³Mary Benson, South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), pp. 163-164.
- ³⁴Ibid., p. 164.
- ³⁵Ibid.; p. 165.
- ³⁶Jim Hoagland, "Black Power in South Africa: Anonymous Youth Movement," Washington Post, January 12, 1977, p. A6, col. 1.
- ³⁷D. A. Kotze, African Politics in South Africa 1964-1974: Parties and Issues (New York: St. Martin's, 1975), p. 39.

³⁸Ibid., p. 62.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 63.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 64.

⁴²Ibid., p. 65.

⁴³Jim Hoagland, "New Era of Black Defiance Jolts Afrikaner Complacency," Washington Post, January 9, 1977, p. A16, col. 2.

⁴⁴Ibid.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Jim Hoagland, "Black Power in South Africa: Anonymous Youth Movement," op. cit., p. A6, col. 5.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. A6, col. 6.

⁴⁹Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, Eastern ed., December 13, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Chapter 3

SEPARATE TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT

The Natives Land Act of 1913 accorded statutory recognition for the provision of separate African areas. This became an important prerequisite for the establishment of separate governmental institutions for these areas. Local councils already existed in certain areas, such as in the Transkei where district councils and a general council were established in 1894.¹

The system of local councils was extended to all African areas in 1920 by the Native Affairs Act. While these councils afforded the inhabitants an opportunity for participation in local government, they also provided a channel of communication between central government and the people. When the National Party came to power in 1948 there were in existence the well-developed Transkeian council system, fourteen local councils in the Transvaal, three in Natal, two in British Bechuanaland and eight in the Ciskei. The only general council, however, was that of the Transkei.

In 1950, the government elected to investigate the potential of the Bantu areas for implementing "positive" apartheid. The investigation was carried out by the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas Within the Union of South Africa under the chairmanship of Professor F.R. Tomlinson.² It was known as the Tomlinson

Commission, and all its members were carefully chosen for their sympathy with government policies.

The Tomlinson Report, completed in 1954 and summarized for the public two years later, was a great disappointment to the government. The members of the commission chose separate development rather than integration as the answer to South Africa's race problem. Despite their recommendation, the commission's effort was noteworthy for producing a forbidding documentation of the immense difficulties that stood in the way of converting the Bantu areas into viable homelands for the African people.³

The commission emphasized three points: that rehabilitation of these neglected areas was a matter of the greatest urgency; that the expenditure of large sums of money was essential; and that fundamental changes were required in the social and economic structure of the areas.⁴ It called for government expenditures of \$280 million within ten years to relieve the economic backwardness of the areas, urged the introduction of white capital and industrial enterprise, and proposed that Africans be granted freehold title to land to encourage progress. The government disagreed sharply, deciding that the commission had exaggerated the expenditure required. The other two proposals were rejected summarily. A total expenditure of \$100 million was approved, and an initial sum of \$10 million was voted. By 1961 only \$22 million had been spent and though considerable sums of money have been made available since then,

the grave warning of the Tomlinson Commission has not been heeded.

But the most far-reaching--and for the government, the most disturbing--conclusion of the Tomlinson Commission related to population growth in South Africa. Estimating that, by the year 2000 the total population would be 31 million--21 million Africans, 4.5 million whites, 4 million coloreds, and 1.5 million Asians--the commission maintained that, even if its economic proposals were put into effect, the Bantu areas would not be able to accomodate more than 70 per cent of the African population. Thus, the commission had come to the conclusion that, even if the policy of separate development was implemented, under the optimal conditions prescribed by the commission, the Africans, forty-five years later, would still substantially outnumber whites in their own areas--6.5 million Africans to 4 million whites. Thus it was demonstrated that the policy of separate development could not remove the white minority's fear of being overwhelmed by a black majority.

The commission's prognostications have been justified by developments since the report was issued. The African population in the white areas has steadily increased. According to information based on the 1970 census, the number of Africans in the urban areas increased by 1.2 million in the last ten years; 53.3 per cent of the Africans, or almost 8 million, live in the white areas with fewer than 4 million whites; and the proportion of whites to the

total population, which was 19.3 per cent in 1960, has dropped to 17.8 per cent.⁵ The significant fact is that, notwithstanding more than two decades of separate development, including extensive forcible removal of Africans from the towns, more than half the Africans are not living in the Bantu areas. They continue to live in "white" South Africa.

Three years before the Tomlinson Report was completed, the Nationalist Party's policies of separation of the racial groups brought about a shift in emphasis in the nature and purpose of local African government. This shift became embodied in the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. This law was to lay the foundation for the future system of African tribal "homelands."⁶ The Bantu authority system was intended to form a basis for the expansion of local government in the African areas, building upon the traditional governmental institutions to restore the traditional tribal democracy of the Africans.

The tribal authority, consisting of a chief or headman and a number of appointed councilors, is the basic unit in a hierarchical system that extends through district and regional to territorial authorities. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner, a white man, may veto the appointment of any person appointed as a councilor by the chief or headman. Furthermore, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development may, at any time, depose any chief or headman and cancel the appointment of any councilor. The Minister, or

any one of a number of white officials may also, whenever he chooses, attend any meeting of a tribal authority and take part in the deliberations. Finally, a commissioned police officer may attend such meetings whenever he pleases or, a policeman may attend when he has been duly instructed to do so by a commissioned officer.⁷

The Bantu authority system was received by the Africans with attitudes ranging from suspicion to hostility. In some areas, chiefs who accepted the system faced violent opposition from the tribesmen. The violent reaction continued for two years, until it was suppressed by the use of extensive police powers of arrest, control of movement, and banishment, and with the aid of military forces sent into the affected areas.

Ultimately, the government succeeded in getting the new system established by using a combination of force and inducement. By 1968, although small pockets of opposition continued to exist, several hundred Bantu authorities including a number at the territorial level had been established throughout the country. Since then the system has moved steadily toward completion. The extension of the retribalizing process to urban areas was begun with the enactment of the Urban Councils Act of 1961. The first council was established in 1963 and by 1968, there were twelve. The councils, which are subject to arbitrary government control, like the tribal authorities encourage the representation of ethnic units within an urban area.

instead of the African population as a whole. However, they do not offer the Africans any greater powers than those provided by the advisory boards which the councils replaced.⁸

Much had been done to insure separation by 1959; however, nothing had been done to honor the commitment to development. In response to mounting internal and external criticism, the government enacted the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. This was a further legal elaboration of the homeland principle. In accordance with this act, the powers and functions of territorial authorities were greatly increased preparatory to self-government. Urban representatives were appointed by territorial authorities and chiefs. Ethnic groups were delineated and a Commissioner-General was appointed in respect of each group as a representative of the South African government. This Commissioner-General was also to promote the constitutional, economic, and social development of the African population.⁹ The act also provided for the conferment upon territorial authorities of legislative power and the right to impose taxes and undertake works such as public housing. It makes provision also for the commissioners-general to "give guidance to the units in order to promote their general development."¹⁰

The act abolished the existing parliamentary representation of the Africans. Since 1936 the Africans of the Cape Province had been represented in the House of Assembly by three white members out of a total of forty-eight. This

complete and summary disenfranchisement of four-fifths of the South African population was justified in an official statement by the twofold argument that the existing representation was "the source of European fears of being swamped by the Bantu in the political sphere," and that the "legitimate needs and desires" of the African would receive better attention under the new system.¹¹

According to the act, eight national homes or Bantustans were originally designated: Transkei, Zululand, Gazankulu, Ciskei, Swazi, Bophuthatswans, Lebowa, and Vondaland. (See PLATE I for a map of reserves and border areas as of 1970.) The Bantu people within these areas were to eventually enjoy self-government and independent development along their own separate lines.¹²

The establishment of territorial authorities, in addition to replacing all previous local and general councils and providing for the consolidation of 264 scattered native reserves into the eight national homes, implied the development of national governmental institutions for each ethnic group. This was a large stepping-stone toward African political representation in accordance with not only racial, but also ethnic differentiation.

Self-Governing African Areas

The Transkeian Territories General Council, from 1894 to 1956, led the way in continuously petitioning the government for greater powers, but to no avail. However,



in 1961 a proposal was accepted by the Transkeian Territorial Authority that a recess committee be appointed "to go into the implications of the granting or otherwise of self-government to their authority."¹³ Following the report of the recess committee, and approval thereof by the Transkei Territorial Authority in 1963, the authority enacted the Transkei Constitution Act. The act granted self-government to the Transkei. However, the powers granted by the constitution--the final form of which was approved by the South African government--did not cover the whole of the traditional area of the Transkei, and the government of the Republic controlled the Transkei Legislative Assembly. The assembly was, however, empowered to legislate with respect to a number of matters: taxation, interior courts, public works, welfare services, and "generally all matters which in the opinion of the State President and according to his written direction are of a merely local or private nature in the Transkei."¹⁴ Above all, the legislative competency of the assembly was subject to the overriding limitation that no law passed by the assembly, even when it related to a matter within its competence, could take effect unless it received the approval of the President of the Republic of South Africa.

In the economic domain, advancement in the Transkei has been hampered by inadequate funds and South Africa's refusal to permit normal industrial development within the territory. The Bantu Investment Corporation was established

in 1959. This corporation was controlled by a board of white directors appointed by the South African government. In 1965 another such entity, the Xhosa Development Corporation, was established. The record of both corporations belies the claims made for them by the government. Overall financial aid has been inadequate. Healthy industrial development is further seriously inhibited by South Africa's policy of "border industries," that is, the refusal to permit white capital and initiative within the Bantu areas, accompanied by inducements to whites to set up industries close to the borders. Cheap labor for such border industries is supplied by the inhabitants of the Bantu area.¹⁵ The result is that the Transkei provides employment within the territory for only a handful of its people, while hundreds work in the mines, factories, and farms of white South Africa. The problems created by inadequate employment opportunities within the territory have been increased by the repatriation of Transkei citizens employed in the Cape Province. This forced removal of men from jobs in the Cape Province and their forced return to a putative homeland that has no jobs to offer within its borders continues, "notwithstanding repeated protests by Transkei Prime Minister Matanzima."¹⁶

Following the Transkei Constitution Act, the pattern was set by the South African government for the granting of self-government to the other African homelands. However, as in the Transkei, development in the other Bantu areas

has been sporadic and slow. Although progress had been made in the establishment of Bantu authorities in some areas, such as in Zululand, opposition to the system continued until 1969.

Limited executive powers had been given in 1968 and 1969 to the territorial authorities of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Vendaland, and Gazankulu homelands. All these territorial authorities were converted into non-self-governing legislative assemblies in terms of the Bantu Homelands Constitution Act of 1971. A number of legislative assemblies were created during that year to take the place of territorial authorities already established under the Bantu Authorities Act. A Kwazulu Territorial Authority was established for the first time only in 1970. By 1972, either territorial authorities or legislative assemblies had been established in all the homelands, except the Swazi homeland. Subsequently, between 1972 and 1973 non-self-governing legislative assemblies were granted self-governing status in Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Lebowa, Vendaland, Gazankulu, Ndebele and Basotho-Qwaqwa. At the beginning of 1974 the only remaining non-self-governing homelands were Swazi and Kwazulu. Since that time, both of these homelands have achieved self-governing status. The African population outside the homelands is subject to the rule of the South African government, without representation.

The Bantustans were created by a government under

which the African people concerned had no choice in whether they were to be formed or not. They were aimed at separating the races and denying the rights to the African population of 87 per cent of the territory of South Africa in return for promises of self-government in the remaining 13 per cent. The Bantustans were not requested by black South African leaders. They were forced upon them. Additionally, the units are not economically viable. They do not provide a minimum standard of living for even the existing population of less than four million. There are no industries or mineral resources and famines have been reported in the Transvaal areas.

Currently, Prime Minister Vorster's grand apartheid policy mandates the physical exiling of all blacks from the 87 per cent of the country declared to be "white territory." Eventually, the ten tribal reserves which have been carved out of South Africa are to be transformed into fully independent states to "satisfy the national aspirations" of all blacks, including the 6 to 8 million who will remain in South Africa's white areas as "foreign workers."¹⁷ It is conceivable that these 6 to 8 million, whose labor will still be needed in the white areas, could then be reclassified as "aliens."¹⁸

Fully implemented, separate development would shift to the extremely vulnerable independent homeland governments many of the onerous tasks of apartheid. It became apparent in 1972 that the South African government is sin-

cere in pushing the various Bantustans toward eventual independence "so that blacks in South Africa can no longer demand voting rights or social rights because these can be exercised in the Bantustans."¹⁹ Prime Minister Vorster during news interviews was asked if the area set aside for the Bantustans was sufficiently large, wealthy and developed to be economically viable should it reach the independence he wants it to attain. In reply, he questioned the need for economic viability in order to have such independence.²⁰

Prime Minister Vorster's desires were partially satisfied when, in October 1976, the Transkei was proclaimed an independent state, the first such homeland to attain this status. It has not, however, been granted recognition as such by other nations including the United States because of South Africa's apartheid policy.²¹ The grant of independence was not without a great amount of controversy and some violence. Upon gaining independence, every black person however remotely connected with the Transkei automatically became a citizen of the Republic. Additionally, in July 1976, nine members of the Transkei's opposition Democratic Party were arrested by security police on orders of then Chief Kaiser Matanzima. This move effectively stifled opposition to the territory's acceptance of independence from the South African government. The arrests, occurring just before the Transkei Assembly adopted a new constitution, have been seen as another indication that "the apartheid policy of South Africa does not involve creating

independent, democratic nations because democracy and sovereignty are missing."²² As could be predicted from the arrests of the opposition leaders, Chief Kaiser Matanzima became Prime Minister, bringing to power his National Independence Party.

Following his election success, Prime Minister Matanzima, in an assertive speech, affirmed the will of his new nation to be truly sovereign. This he did while sharply condemning South Africa's racial policy.

Seen as a major step forward by the South African government in alleviating the oppressive policies of apartheid, separate development is now recognized as not being the panacea for racial inequality. Prime Minister Vorster has stressed the belief that the government's policy will persuade the world that white South Africa is sincere about separate black African development. A number of black African countries have countered this belief by calling the program of independence an elaborate sham, while vowing never to recognize the independence republics. Although politically independent, the Transkei will remain economically dependent upon South Africa, since 8 per cent of all adult male Transkeians work in "white" South Africa. Zulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's denunciation of "balkanization" of the country through separate development has voiced the belief of a number of black South African leaders that the government's policies will amount to a chain of labor reserves for white South Africa.²³ Other South African

territories, after having achieved independence, will also remain dependent upon South Africa economically.²⁴ This will be especially true as population growth outpaces economic growth. Therefore, the policy of separate development appears to be incompatible with the facts of South African life. Its feasibility is becoming increasingly doubtful because of the poverty of the homelands and the dependence of the South African economy on African labor.

CHAPTER 3 NOTES

¹D. A. Kotze, African Politics in South Africa 1964-1974: Parties and Issues (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), p. 25.

²Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 113.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Editorial, The Star [Johannesburg], October 3, 1970, p. 22.

⁶Kotze, loc. cit.

⁷Leo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 119-126.

⁸Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 115.

⁹Kotze, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

¹⁰Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 116.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²U.N. General Assembly, 18th Session, Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (A/5497, September 16, 1963), p. 47.

¹³Kotze, op. cit., p. 28.

¹⁴Rubin and Weinstein, loc. cit.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 117. In 1968, the Promotion of Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act provided for the creation of further corporations, all under government control, and with restrictions on their activities calculated to prevent the creation of any but minimal opportunities for the

economic advancement of the people. This law perpetuates declared government policy--condemned by leading South African economists--of preventing the introduction of white capital or initiative into the Bantu homelands. Economic development since the enactment of this law has been disappointing. However, since 1973, there have been some relaxations on an ad hoc basis of the prohibition of white capital.

¹⁶D. Hobart-Houghton, "Economic Development in the Reserves," Race Relations Journal, 29, No. 1 (1962), pp. 10-19.

¹⁷Jim Hoagland, "Afrikaners Split Over Apartheid," Washington Post, January 11, 1977, p. A1, col. 6.

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹C. Mohr, New York Times, Final Late City ed., November 27, 1972.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., October 26, 1976.

²²Editorial, Chicago Tribune, August 6, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

²³Editorial, Manchester Guardian, June 7, 1975, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

²⁴The Bophuthatswana tribal reserve is scheduled to gain independence late in 1977, and is slated to be followed by Vendaland and the Ciskei, whose territories include a number of scattered parcels of land.

Chapter 4

THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

We are related--you and I.
You from the West Indies,
I from Kentucky.
We are related--you and I.
You from Africa,
I from these States.
We are brother--you and I.¹

There have occurred three phases in the evolution of Pan-Africanism. The first of these was the gathering of "exiles" in Europe and the United States. During this period (late 1940s to late 1950s) Africans, West Indians and Americans of African descent more or less "discovered" one another. Sharing common disabilities and increasingly aware of many common elements in their heritage, they convened conferences on an ad hoc basis, organized student groups and cultural associations, and in the latter stages turned to explicit political agitation for African independence. The second phase was the nationalism of Pan-Africanism. During this period (late 1950s to late 1960s) there was a progressive shift in the forces of political agitation to individual territories in Africa; this followed upon the formation of territorial nationalist movements. With the attainment of independence by many African states, the second phase gradually gave way to the contemporary one, which is characterized by two lines of activity. The first of these is the political action within and among independent African states, in close collaboration with

nationalist movements from the remaining colonial territories and European-dominated states, and having as its aim the complete liberation of all of Africa from alien and European minority rule. The second aim is the achievement of genuine African unity, which is the espoused precondition for the much-needed economic development of the African continent as well as for making the African voice in world politics both respected and effective. It is this third phase with which we are concerned.

One of the clearest dangers perceived by the South African government in the early 1960s was the threat of externally-supported internal violence following African unity. Following the emergence of new "black" states in South Africa, the ranks of the Republic of South Africa's militant opponents were substantially reinforced, both in terms of numbers and commitment. In attacking South Africa and her system of apartheid, the Africans brought with them a burning conviction of right. They saw themselves introducing a new morality and justice into international relations. The African feels that by fighting for himself he has been fighting "for nothing less than the human personality itself. The sense of mission was never more clearly felt than in opposition to white minority rule in South Africa."²

The new African states believed that the overthrow of white minority rule in South Africa should be one of the principal tasks of international organizations.

When they raised the issue at the United Nations or when they took a case to the International Court of Justice, they were not aiming at a dialogue with the South Africans, or a compromise solution for conflicting interests, or a legal clarification of complex issues; they were out to attest their belief and to organize action against what they termed the "racist society." The African states brought new life and strength to the diplomatic attacks on South Africa and swung world opinion even further against the Republic. In itself this was an achievement, but the Africans wanted more than that. They wanted the international organizations to move away from "advising," "calling upon," or "urging" the South Africans to a commitment to action. In their public statements the Africans were confident of their cause; confident that a society built upon apartheid could not stand. They were also confident that the international organizations would play a major part in bringing it down. Such confidence made assumptions not only about the compelling forces of a moral cause, but also about the effectiveness of the international organizations.³ Potentially one of the chief sources of danger for the Republic was the new African body, the Organization of African Unity.

Establishing the Organization

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created on May 25, 1963 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, when the repre-

representatives of thirty independent black African nations approved the OAU Charter. Togo and Morocco, though absent from the conference, signed shortly afterward to bring the number of members to thirty-two. The subsequent independence and adherence of Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, The Gambia, Botswana, and Lesotho brought membership to thirty-eight. The OAU membership, now numbering forty-eight, includes every independent state in Africa except South Africa and Rhodesia.⁴

The OAU is the outcome of a movement toward African unity, which from 1957-on expressed itself in many organizational forms. There had been the Conference of Independent African States held at Accra, Ghana in April, 1958. However, this body became ineffective with the formation of rival groups: The Brazzaville Group (which became a part of the Monrovia Group) and The Casablanca Group.⁵

In December 1960 the ex-French territories met at Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, to discuss ways of coordinating their political and economic policies. In September, 1961 the "Brazzaville states" formed the Union of African and Malagasy States (UAM) which Ruanda and Togo later joined. The UAM, conservative in outlook, favored close cooperation and preservation of the state system bequeathed by the colonial era.⁶

Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Egypt, and Algeria met at Casablanca, Morocco in January, 1961. These states held that the independence of new African nations would not

be complete until ties with the colonial West were cut and neo-colonial economic and political influence on the continent liquidated. This was a view which inclined them to seek their allies in the East. Intervention in the internal affairs of states which catered to the neo-colonial powers was justified in their eyes, and they placed their hopes for the future of Africa in the creation of a supranational organization.⁷

An attempt to bring together the members of the two rival groups, along with those states which belonged to neither, was made at the Monrovia Conference in May, 1961. When this effort failed, a second attempt was made at the Lagos Conference in January, 1962. When this also failed, arrangements were made for the Pan-African Summit Conference at Addis Ababa. The outcome of this conference was the creation of the OAU.⁸

The Framework of OAU Support

The OAU receives its authority to support the struggle for the liberation of South Africa from its Charter, which establishes as one of the OAU's purposes "to eradicate all forms of [oppression] from Africa."⁹ To this end, the Charter commits all OAU member states to solemnly adhere to the principle of "absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still [oppressed]".¹⁰

It was quite obvious at the Summit Conference in

Addis Ababa that the issue of emancipation of South Africa was at the forefront in the minds of the African heads of state and government who attended the conference. Both in speeches and resolutions, the issue of the liberation of South Africa was emphasized. In fact, the issue of liberation was high on the agenda--it was number two--and became the first resolution adopted by that conference.¹¹ The resolution was further reaffirmed by the first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the supreme organ of the OAU, at its meeting in Cairo in July 1964.¹²

The Decolonization Resolution, as it came to be known, defined the role of the OAU in the liberation of all of southern Africa. The OAU was to become the conscience of Africa insofar as the denial of human rights to the African peoples in southern Africa was concerned. It was to serve as the direct moral, military, and territorial support to the African nationalists waging armed struggles in their respective territories. Additionally, the OAU was to mount diplomatic support in the United Nations and other international organizations. Its diplomatic efforts were to be aimed at educating the international public to the ills of the political system in South Africa, where according to the OAU, power is exercised in complete disregard of the African majority. These efforts were also focused upon isolating the South African regime and identifying its allies; and at identifying the United Nations

with the aspirations of the African peoples in their territories. The latter effort was made in the hope that the United Nations could be forced to take direct action on behalf of the oppressed peoples of South Africa.¹³

The OAU, realizing how difficult the task before them was, set up a special fund to be raised by voluntary contributions of member states to supply the necessary practical and financial aid to the various African national liberation movements. A coordinating committee, which has come to be known as the "Liberation Committee," was established to propose the necessary fund and the apportionment among OAU member states, and to coordinate the assistance from African states for the liberation of black South Africa. The Liberation Committee has its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. In the beginning, the committee was composed of nine African states, but it has now been expanded to a total membership of 17 African states. The Liberation Committee develops the strategy of OAU support for the liberation of black South Africa and reports to the Council of Ministers, which makes recommendations to the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government. It is this assembly that is ultimately responsible for deciding what role the OAU should continue to play in the support of struggles for the liberation of all of southern Africa.

The Liberation Committee met in January, 1973 in Accra to redefine "the objectives and strategy of the liberation struggle and to recognize defects and the

shortcomings of the OAU."¹⁴ The conference did not, however, alter the objectives of the OAU in South Africa.

The OAU as a Unifying Instrument

Shortly after the formation of the OAU, the nationalist movements in all the southern African territories suffered from internal strains brought about by personality clashes, personal ambitions, and differences in strategy. These strains by and large led to polarization of the movements, and each territory began to have more than one movement claiming legitimacy and supremacy in the struggle for that territory's liberation. In South Africa, this was manifested by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC).¹⁵

In such a polarized situation, the OAU was faced with a problem of recognition. It was essential for the OAU to determine the legitimate movement as it was on this determination that the OAU could give support. The Conference of Independent African States "earnestly" invited all national liberation movements to coordinate their efforts by "establishing common action fronts whenever necessary so as to strengthen the effectiveness of their struggle and the rational use of the concerted assistance given them."¹⁶ This invitation was extended in May, 1963, and was repeated time and time again by the organs of the OAU. This was a clear invitation to the liberation movements to find strength in unity and to put scarce resources

at the disposal of the OAU for maximum use. Time and time again, the OAU invitation still fell on deaf ears. Both the ANC and the PAC hoped that the OAU would recognize it; at times, because of the support given to the ANC and PAC by some African governments and some non-African states, there was a mood of defiance and even contempt for the OAU in the ranks of these movements. The mood undermined the unifying role of the OAU.

Having failed to forge unity, the OAU decided that, if the liberation movements representing the same territory could not unite, it would give support to the liberation movements that seemed to be waging a genuine armed struggle inside the involved territories. This decision seemed the most logical in the situation and was made with good intentions. Yet, this very decision led to the misuse of resources, and to the loss of lives for propagandist reasons. It was not until 1973 that the OAU at last began to make some headway in the formal unification of some of the liberation movements, by threatening to terminate all aid to movements that did not unite.

The OAU has also been involved in keeping its member states united behind the liberation movement of black South Africa. The South African regime has attempted to break the united ranks of the OAU member states, notably in the cases of the Ivory Coast and Malawi. In 1971, the Ivory Coast attempted to test the prevailing situation by calling on the African states to engage in a "dialogue" with South

Africa in the hope that a "peaceful" solution could be formulated. The OAU realized that this suggestion was very tempting to African states that were eager to benefit from economic relations with South Africa. The OAU also suspected, with reasonable accuracy, that there were some European powers behind this scheme--notably Britain and France--which were eager to continue their trade with South Africa under the aura of OAU acceptance. Thus, the Council of Ministers decided to move quickly in order to pre-empt the Ivory Coast before it had undermined the efforts of the liberation movements.

The Council, in its 17th ordinary session in June, 1971, reminded all African states and the world that the OAU had adopted the Lusaka Manifesto, which had been endorsed by the United Nations and the Conference of Non-Aligned States.¹⁷ This Manifesto called for a peaceful settlement of the southern African problem by means of direct talks between the regimes and the indigenous populations in the concerned territories. The Manifesto further stated that the process of dialogue must begin from within the territories themselves. The South African government has rejected the Lusaka Manifesto. The Council of Ministers at the June, 1971 session, "agreed that no member state of the OAU would initiate or engage in any type of action that would undermine or abrogate the solemn obligations and undertakings to the commitments contained in the Charter."¹⁸ Due to this, the proposal for "dialogue"

AD-A065 635

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL WASHINGTON DC
BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS AGAINST APARTHEID: A CONTINUING STRUGGLE.(U)
JUN 77 W F MERRICK II

F/G 5/11

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

2 OF 2
AD
A065635



END
DATE
FILMED
5-79
DDC

between African states and the South African regime has been "shelved" for the time being. In addition, the African states have outwardly remained united in support of the liberation of South Africa through armed struggle.

CAU Moral and Material Support

There is no doubt that the CAU has wanted to make the African people of South Africa feel that they are not alone in the struggle against their oppressive regime. Thus, through resolution after resolution, declaration after declaration, the CAU has sought to identify the whole of Africa with the struggle for the liberation of South Africa. Thus, the moral support the CAU has given has been immense. Some authorities, including CAU officials, believe the CAU has survived because of the recognition by nearly all African states that they have a moral obligation to support the liberation of their territories. The CAU is the instrument for the expression of this moral support.

But moral platitudes and condemnatory or supportive resolutions and declarations do not liberate an oppressed people. The CAU organs have behaved at times as if their resolutions were sufficient to assist the African people of South Africa to liberate themselves.

One essential actual support that the CAU does give to the liberation movements concerns the request to certain member states to allow their territories to be used by the movements. The Council of Ministers, in its 15th ordinary

session in August, 1970, urged "African states neighboring oppressed territories to accord liberation movements the facilities necessary for the movement of their men and materials to and from their [homelands] ."19

It is not a light responsibility for a country to have an extra-territorial guerrilla force on its territory. African states, like any other states, are very sensitive to their own security situation. But, those African states--about six in number--called upon by the OAU to fulfill this responsibility have discharged it with a great deal of selflessness. They have allowed guerrillas to be trained on their soil and military hardware to be stored on their territory.²⁰

The OAU has sought to provide another service to the liberation movements in South Africa. Realizing that there has been little progress in the liberation struggles, the Council of Ministers, meeting in its ninth ordinary session in September, 1967, decided to establish an ad hoc committee of 17 military experts to study ways and means of implementing the strategy of the liberation struggles.²¹ This committee became a very useful instrument when the South African liberation struggle seemed to suffer many setbacks between September, 1968 and February, 1969. It offered advice to both the OAU and the liberation movements themselves. Furthermore, it issued a study relating to the distribution of means of struggle, storage of war equipment, and the improvement of transit facilities.

This study is believed to be very useful to the liberation movements. However, the committee is too large for discussions of specific military strategy or the maintenance of secrecy.

The Possibility of OAU Direct Action in South Africa

The OAU has been tempted on occasion to directly involve itself in the actual physical liberation of South Africa. Yet, for the last ten years the OAU has not believed that it was ready to launch a military confrontation with the regime. It has, however, thought it could convince individual African states to apply economic sanctions against the regime. The Summit Conference of the Independent African States that gave birth to the OAU agreed unanimously in May, 1963 "to coordinate concerted measures of sanction against the government of South Africa."²² The first ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government also established in 1964 the Bureau of Sanctions designed to supervise the implementation of the OAU resolutions calling on member states to apply economic sanctions against South Africa.²³

The Council of Ministers, in February, 1966, at its 6th ordinary session was informed by the Bureau of Sanctions that after two years of supposed African sanctions against South Africa there had been no parked progress in the implementation of the OAU sanction resolutions.²⁴ Many African states simply ignored the reso-

lutions and continued to engage in economic relations with South Africa.

The gap between OAU resolutions and OAU performance continues to increase. However, direct OAU intervention in South Africa depends on how the crisis in the area evolves as the struggle for the liberation of South Africa continues.

OAU Diplomatic Initiatives

When the OAU was formed, many African leaders did not understand how the United Nations functioned. They believed that the OAU could pressure the United Nations into taking vigorous action in South Africa on behalf of the oppressed African people. It took almost two years for the OAU and its member states to understand that the United Nations Security Council, as presently structured, is reluctant to take any vigorous action against the South African government.

By 1966 the OAU had begun to shift its tactics. It had become obvious that the United Nations would not be the machinery for the liberation of South Africa. Still, the OAU realized that the United Nations would be an excellent platform to appeal to international conscience about the atrocities the South African regime was reportedly perpetrating. The shifted aim was therefore to isolate the regime in international opinion. In October, 1966 the African Group, formed by the OAU to coordinate the acti-

vities of African states at the United Nations, sponsored a draft resolution in the United Nations General Assembly establishing a unit in the United Nations Secretariat to deal exclusively with the policy of apartheid in order to give maximum publicity to the system. The General Assembly agreed and adopted the resolution.²⁵

An Analysis of Success

Unfortunately, OAU support has not provided the South African liberation movements with any measurable success. In reviewing OAU documents, it becomes obvious that there is little mention of guerrilla activities by the South African liberation movements. However, continuing moral support by the OAU has provided the movements with the confidence that the future holds at least a chance for success.

As has been discussed, each of the OAU member states was "obliged" to make an annual contribution to a fund to support the liberation movements. By 1971 there were forty-one members of the OAU and the annual contributions to the fund should have totaled 900,000 Pounds. In 1970 only twelve states paid their contributions, and the total receipts were under 4,000 Pounds, including 100,000 Pounds in arrears paid by Libya. Some African countries, including Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Senegal, have never paid. By the end of 1970, the total debt was three million Pounds with little chance that this would ever be collected. Only

three African states--Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia--were up-to-date with their payments. The bulk of the funds went to liberation movements in Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola, the three areas in which there was active guerrilla fighting. Little was left to support movements in other areas. One of the liberation movement leaders cynically commented that "independent Africa continuously assures us of support and then expects us to fight with words."²⁶

Some African states explain their failure to pay by criticizing the ineffectiveness of the liberation movements and the OAU Liberation Committee. Following a barrage of these criticisms, the 1969 OAU summit meeting set up a seven-nation investigation committee to investigate the work of the Liberation Committee. Little progress was made by this committee, which lamely excused itself by saying that only 14 African states had completed a questionnaire which it had circulated.²⁷ It has even been argued that tough words with very limited action may well have actually favored the Republic of South Africa, by creating a credibility gap in the international organization and by forewarning the South African government of any action that may be taken. This latter point was made by some of the liberation movements at the OAU. They claimed that militant statements by African states had encouraged the South African government to undertake massive rearmament, and so make a difficult task even more

difficult.²⁸

The OAU had pledged from the beginning its support for those who were struggling to liberate Africans from the white-dominated governments of southern Africa. It has become evident, however, that when the OAU attempts to move from the policy-making phase to the specifics of implementation, it generally fails. That is a result of its diplomatic style. In addition, the African states do not take resolutions of the OAU seriously. They rightly realize that these resolutions represent general sentiments, not detailed agreements. The OAU often overstates a situation; thus, in 1972, the Council of Ministers condemned the United States, the United Kingdom, and France for illegal shipments of arms to South Africa. It was generally accepted that only France was actually shipping arms; the other two countries were condemned primarily to save the French state some degree of direct embarrassment.

Finally, as a possible indication of its coming epitaph, the January, 1976 annual summit meeting of the OAU in Mauritius left the organization at the lowest point in its 13-year history. Only nine out of the current forty-eight African heads of state attended. Several of those who did attend left before the conclusion of the meeting. The only noteworthy "action" taken against apartheid was an agreement among members present on their criticism of the system.²⁹

Although other international organizations have

taken firm stands against the South African government's policy of apartheid (most notably the United Nations, which excluded South Africa from participation in the General Assembly in October, 1974 and refused to recognize the Transkei as an independent state when it achieved such status in October, 1976) this discussion has been limited to the Organization of African Unity, for it has been this organization alone which has actively joined or sanctioned the struggle of the black South African people. However, as has been demonstrated, the independent African states have been unable to achieve the unity originally intended. And, even more disappointing to "black" South Africa, they have thus been unable to provide a unified front against the forces of the white South African government and its system of apartheid.

CHAPTER 4 NOTES

¹Langston Hughes, "We Are Brother--You and I," in "Five Writers and Their African Ancestors," Flydon, ed. Harold Isaacs, 3rd Quarter, 1960, 8.

²James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 141.

³Ibid., p. 143.

⁴U.S., Department of State, "The Organization of African Unity," Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1965, p. 670.

⁵The Brazzaville Group included Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Upper Volta. The Monrovia Group included the above states plus Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, and Tunisia. The Casablanca Group included all of the other independent African states.

⁶Nora McKeon, "The African States and the OAU," International Affairs, July, 1966, p. 392.

⁷Ibid., p. 395.

⁸Arnold Rivkin, "The Organization of African Unity," Current History, April, 1965, 240-42.

⁹Yassin El-Ayouty, ed., The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 134.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 135.

¹¹Conference of Independent African States, Plenary Session 2, Resolution 2, A, Agenda Item II, "Decolonization."

¹²Organization of African Unity Documents AHG/Res. 7 (1), AHG/Res. 8 (1), and AHG/Res. 9 (1).

¹³El-Ayouty, op. cit., p. 136.

¹⁴Organization of African Unity Document CM/497
(Part 1), p. 17.

¹⁵El-Ayouty, op. cit., p. 137.

¹⁶Conference of Independent African States, Plenary
Session 2, Resolution 2, A, para. 10.

¹⁷Organization of African Unity Document CM/St.
5 (xvii).

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Organization of African Unity Document CM/Res.
266 (xv).

²⁰The six states include Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia, Zaire, Botswana, and Malawi.

²¹Organization of African Unity Document CM/Res.
103 (ix).

²²Conference of Independent African States, Plenary
Session 2, Resolution 2, B.

²³Organization of African Unity Document AHG/Res.
6 (1).

²⁴Organization of African Unity Document CM/111 (vi).

²⁵El-Ayouty, op. cit., p. 147.

²⁶Z. Cervenka, The Organization of African Unity
and Its Charter (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1969), p. 281.

²⁷Ibid., p. 282.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 281-282.

²⁹Nicholas Ashford, The Times [London], July 7, 1976.

Chapter 5

BLACK LEADERSHIP

In December, 1964 Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella summarized the consciousness of the African people by writing:

Only yesterday a few powers, holding in subjection three-quarters of humanity, determined both law and history; but the staggering combat in which the people of Africa and Asia engaged in order to liberate themselves from colonial oppression has radically modified their situation. Today, most of the nations formerly colonized, subjected, and exploited, have regained their independence and their dignity and have emerged on the international scene. Sure of their good right, henceforward they will make themselves heard in the affairs of the world.

However, in certain countries of our continent, as of the continent of Asia, the fight continues. Faced with colonialism, imperialism, and with racism, certain peoples must fight on, and they pay a heavy price for that liberty to which they aspire. It is the struggle of one of these peoples, that of South Africa, that concerns us here.

It is inherent in colonialism, certainly, that it secretes racism. But nowhere in the world has racism taken forms so violent, so virulent, or so odious as in South Africa. Institutionalized and codified under the word "apartheid," it remains the shame of humanity. Eleven million Africans, dispossessed of their lands and their wealth, dispossessed of their own country, live in torment and in terror. Parked in the Reserves, they are separated from the world, into a universe of nightmare and horror. . . . For their own self-respect, and for the self-respect of man, the best sons of Africa are now rising up to eliminate that shame of our time which is called: Apartheid. And in the struggle in which they have engaged in South Africa under the leadership of Albert Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, and their companions, worthy sons of Africa that they are, they know that henceforth they are not alone. Free Africa is at their sides, as are all those countries that are on the path which leads to the true liberation of mankind.¹

This section will discuss four of the more influ-

ential black South African leaders--individuals who in their time have possessed large followings and the potential for leading South Africa to freedom--men of such magnitude and determination as have been described by Ahmed Ben Bella (see Appendix B for biographical summaries of the four individuals).

Albert John Nvumbi Luthuli

Men like Luthuli, a third-generation Christian, a teacher, and an elected modernizing chief, began to understand the European-created and European-dominated state from the inside. They accepted the idea of modernization . . . , and they opposed previous leadership.²

Albert Luthuli, graduate of European-run Adams college, sought means of working through the South African government's bureaucratic processes in leading his peoples' struggle against apartheid. In this endeavor he continually stressed the need for a peaceful solution to his country's racial problem. Although willing to adhere to governmental processes, Luthuli was not willing to remain unobtrusive in the midst of the turmoil of his time. A devout Christian, he was actively involved both nationally and internationally in religious organizations. "To remain neutral where the laws of the land virtually criticized God for having created men of color was the sort of thing [he] could not, as a Christian, tolerate."³

After numerous protests and appeals for the removal of apartheid, Luthuli led his people from negotiation to defiance--"to deliberate disobedience of

apartheid laws coupled with readiness to accept the punishment provided by law.⁴ In so-doing he became one of the prominent leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) and, eventually, the organization's President-General. Although becoming committed to the ANC's Program of Action and Defiance Campaign, he continually denounced open violence as opposed to peaceful demonstrations and work stoppages. In speaking of his involvement with the ANC, Luthuli has said, "Our vision has always been that of a non-racial democratic South Africa which upholds the rights of all who live in our country to remain there as full citizens with equal rights and responsibilities with all others."⁵

In espousing his and his peoples' visions, Luthuli has stated:

The true patriots of South Africa, for whom I speak, will be satisfied with nothing less than the fullest democratic rights. In government we will not be satisfied with anything less than direct individual adult suffrage and the right to stand for and be elected to all organs of government. In economic matters we will be satisfied with nothing less than equality of opportunity in every sphere, and the enjoyment by all of those heritages which form the resources of the country which up to now have been appropriated on a racial "whites only" basis. In culture we will be satisfied with nothing less than the opening of all doors of learning in non-segregatory institutions on the sole criterion of ability. In the social sphere we will be satisfied with nothing less than the abolition of all racial bars. We do not demand these things for people of African descent alone. We demand them for all South Africans, white and black.⁶

Luthuli continued his struggle until his death in 1967, never ceasing in his efforts to find a peaceful solution to the race problem. The feelings he held in

the latter stages of his life have held great meaning for his people in carrying forward his efforts:

The struggle must go on--the struggle to make the opportunity for the building to begin. The struggle will go on. I speak humbly and without levity when I say that, God giving me strength and courage enough, I shall die, if need be, for this cause. But I do not want to die until I have seen the building begun. Mayibuye Afrika! Come, Africa, come!

His Christian beliefs, his stature, the large following of his homeland, and his desire for peace and freedom formed the base upon which he stood and fought against the system of apartheid. In 1961, as a recognition of his untiring efforts, Luthuli was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.

Nelson Mandela

Nelson Mandela, as a man, has been described as follows:

Passionate, emotional, sensitive, quickly strung to bitterness and retaliation by insult and patronage. He has a natural air of authority. He cannot help magnetizing a crowd; he is commanding with a tall, handsome bearing; trusts and is trusted by the youth, for their impatience reflects his own; appealing to the women. He is dedicated and fearless. He is the born mass leader.

Espousing the ideals and aims of African nationalism, Mandela summarized his strong beliefs at the Rivonia Treason Trial in 1963:

There are two streams of African nationalism. One centers around Marcus Garvey's slogan "Africa for the Africans." It is based on the "quiet Africa" slogan and on the cry "Hurl the white man into the sea." This brand of African nationalism is extreme and ultra-revolutionary. There is another stream of African

nationalism, Africanism, which the Congress Youth League professes. We of the Youth League take account of the concrete situation in South Africa and realize that the different racial groups have come to stay, but we insist that a condition for interracial peace and progress is the abandonment of white domination and such a change in the basic structure of South African society that those relations that breed exploitation and human misery will disappear. Therefore our goal is the winning of national freedom for the African people and the inauguration of a peoples' free society where racial oppression and persecution will be outlawed.

Nelson Mandela fought for his beliefs, not because of what he had been told or promised, but because of his experience in South Africa and his own African background. He has always regarded himself as an African patriot, attracted by the idea of a classless society. He was influenced by Marxist thought, accepting the idea that his country is in need of some form of socialism to enable his people to catch up with the advanced countries of the world and to overcome their legacy of extreme poverty.¹⁰ Mandela has been influenced in his thoughts by both East and West, but has remained seemingly impartial and objective, tying himself to no particular system of society other than that of socialism.

Throughout his lifetime Mandela has dedicated himself to the struggle of the African people, fighting against white domination and black domination, and cherishing the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities.¹¹ He is the symbol of the self-sacrificing leadership his struggle has thrown to the forefront and which his people need. He

is an outstanding individual, but he knows that he derives his strength from the great masses of people who make up the freedom trail in South Africa.

Mary Benson has written that, "It was during the last four-and-one-half years of the Rreason Trial that onliikers began to take notice of Mandela."¹² In Dar-es-Salaan in December, 1964 Oliver Tambo, Mandela's former law partner and member of the ANC, wrote:

I am convinced that the world-wide protests during the Rivonia Trial saved Mandela and his fellow-accused from a death sentence. But in South Africa a life sentence means imprisonment until death--or until the defeat¹³ of the government which holds these men prisoner.

Mandela wrote eleven articles, one conference speech and compiled evidence and addresses from three trials during the period 1953 to 1963. As it is a criminal offense to circulate the works of a "banned person," the South Africans may not read his writing. One can be assured, however, that the South African people know what Mandela has written. At the close of Mandela's first trial, the crowd of supporters and spectators ignored the government ban on demonstrations and marched up the street singing "Tshotcholoze Mandela" ("Carry on Mandela").

The present South African government is also aware of Mandela's following. In April 1976, the Transkei government, led by then Chief Kaiser Matanzima, requested amnesty for Mandels and three others imprisoned on Robben Island. In an effort to enhance the prestige of the Trans-

kei government, South African Prime Minister Vorster is expected to comply eventually. Mandela, however, is expected to refuse amnesty as he believes his release would make the white policy of separate development respectable.¹⁴ As he said at his trial, ". . . when my sentence has been completed, I will still be moved, as men are always moved by their consciences."¹⁵

Kaiser Daliwonga Katanzima

Kaiser Katanzima, Prime Minister of the newly-independent Transkei, has fostered a long political career. This career has been marked by a strong individual will, often in sharp opposition to the policies of the government of South Africa. He has consistently criticized the racial inequality imposed by South Africa's white minority government, denouncing the pervasive restrictions on the normal lives of South Africa's black population.

Katanzima has constantly followed one fundamental strategy: independence for Xhosa-speaking ethnic groups under Xhosa rule in as much of the territory historically held by Xhosa-speaking people as can be negotiated away from white rule. Nationalism is seen as the dominant source of his political motivation. In a 1965 university lecture, Katanzima stated:

I am a disciple of the creed of nationalism. I believe in Xhosa nationalism because I was born to it. I was swaddled in it since the day of my birth. It has been my appointed task to develop it and sponsor and foster it. My heritage commands me in the name of nationhood to sacrifice the best of my abilities

to the advancement of my own nation in its own country according to the terms of its own culture.¹⁴

However, the Transkei's accession to formal independence has in some eyes "marked an apparent acceptance by the new Prime Minister of the keystone of South Africa's racial blueprint: separate development."¹⁵ Kwazulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has answered this accusation by stressing that he and his colleague have accepted South Africa's policy of apartheid "because it is the only way blacks can find political expression."¹⁶ In the long-run, Matanzima proposes a confederation of southern African black states, composed of the African homelands in South Africa and neighboring independent countries.

In obtaining independence for the Transkei, the first step in Matanzima's plan of action, he has been relentless, untiring and at times brutal. He used the intervening years between 1961, when he was elected Chief Minister of the Transkei Territorial Authority, and 1976, when he was elected Prime Minister, to neutralize his political opposition. This action culminated in a wave of imprisonment for most of his opponents in the South African Parliament, without trial, as the day of independence approached.

Matanzima has, throughout his life, felt a driving urge to assist his people in whatever manner necessary to remove apartheid from their homeland. Likewise, his endeavors have led him to assist them in developing as

high a standard of living as is possible. In this respect, two of Matanzima's primary interests have been education and agriculture. He is quite proud of having founded the first primary school in his home district, and continues to work for improved educational opportunities for his people. In addition, he has continued to remain abreast of Western agricultural developments, instituting as many as the economy will allow within the Transkei.

Matanzima does not share power readily, believes in the traditional role of hereditary chiefs, and makes no attempt to achieve the common touch. He has been described as "aloof and imperious."¹⁷ As Prime Minister, Matanzima is expected to head a strongly conservative government. He has promised general elections, abolition of all apartheid rules within the Transkei, and Transkei citizenship to any whites who revoke South African citizenship.¹⁸

Recognized as a political force to be reckoned with, the South African government has closely monitored, and in some cases supported, the activities of Matanzima. In so-doing, the government has been careful to remain relatively clear of Transkei internal affairs. An example of his stature in relation to the Nationalist government was indicated when, in October, 1974, then Chief Matanzima was appointed as a member of the South African delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, thereby for the first time integrating the delegation. Concerning the import of his newly-independent state and his political

successes, Matanzima has said, "Just as Jews everywhere gained a new stature with the coming into being of the promised land, Israel, so too we Transkeians have given all blacks in South Africa new dignity by blazing the trail and founding a black Transkei."¹⁹

Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi

Today a man is rising with meteoric swiftness and, if his enthusiastic reception by his people in Zululand and by Zulus in Durban and Johannesburg is any indication, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi gives promise of drawing the proud Zulus into a nation once more.²⁰

This prophetic quote, from the works of a notable scholar of African affairs, seems to have been fulfilled six years after it was written. G. H. Calpin, a columnist in the Afrikaans paper Rapport, wrote, "If a South Africa under majority rule were conceivable [he does not think it is] , then the head of such a state would probably be Buthelezi."²¹ For any Zulu to be a great leader of his people, he requires the support of the common man, an appreciation of tradition, and some linkage with Zulu aristocracy. Buthelezi possesses all of these, combining modern pragmatism with a knowledge of and reverence for Zulu tradition. He does not offend Zulu taboos, but finds routes around any which might hinder modernization. His status and following among Zulus is evidenced by his being able to usurp power from the traditional Zulu monarch, King Goodwill, to the point of Goodwill's functions being now limited largely to ceremonial events.

Buthlezi has been a longtime critic of the South African government's plan for separate development. Without his support, plans for a "Zulustan" stalled year after year.²² However, in June, 1970 Buthelezi stressed that he had some reservations about South Africa's apartheid policy, but regarded the then proposed Zulu homeland as an experiment and offered Prime Minister Vorster his cooperation. In a news conference in Pretoria, he said, "the majority of white people do not want to integrate with blacks and some blacks realize how futile it is to want to impose oneself on people who don't want to integrate."²³ He additionally assured Prime Minister Vorster that "blacks are not committed to violence with its catastrophic aftermath."²⁴ Therefore, although still believing in a non-racial South Africa, in June, 1970 Buthelezi changed his tactics and became Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority. In his inaugural speech, however, he made it clear that he was still "his own man."²⁵ In addition, he openly rejected the customary oath of loyalty to the white South African government, as well as taking it upon himself to appoint his own cabinet without consulting with government officials.

Following his inauguration, Buthelezi requested permission to travel to other countries, and has since visited the United States, Britain, Europe, and other African countries. During these visits he vigorously attacked the hypocrisy of apartheid and fought to gain

recognition for his people. For this black Africa has applauded him as a hero and political leader of unusual ability.

Buthelezi has been described as:

A man of temperate habits--which is not always characteristic of Zulu leaders. No one on the present political horizon has Buthelezi's unique combination of a strong traditional background, a well-educated and sharp mind, and a sense of fair play and destiny.²⁶

But his leadership goes far beyond the Zulus. He is one of the African members of the group of leading politicians and academicians of all races and parties who are known as "Synthesis."²⁷ This group's existence has been described by liberal white South Africans as significant to the point that it may greatly influence any new generation of Nationalist leaders.²⁸ In addition, in January, 1974, after South Africa's opposition United Party adopted the principle of greater contact between race groups and rejected the idea of permanent white dominance, the party leader, Harry Schwartz, signed a declaration of faith with Buthelezi.²⁹ The declaration stressed their beliefs in South Africa's future as a peaceful, multi-racial society with equal opportunity for all, and held that change must be brought about peacefully.

At the present time, Buthelezi's future status seems not to be approaching that of Prime Minister of a majority government, but to be remaining as that of a Chief Executive Officer. He admittedly is not enamored

of the concept of separate development, but, as it appears to be the only way blacks can find political expression in South Africa, it is one road along which he can lead his people. He believes the concept will fail without Zulu support, but also believes neither side can tolerate an indefinite standoff. He has therefore grasped the present opportunity for what it may be worth. Buthelezi is, however, firmly against independent homelands. He has stated in this regard that "the strongest weapon black Africans have is to refuse to accept independence until the 13 per cent of South Africa's land currently allotted to black areas is increased and other opportunities are expanded."³⁰ For Zulus, Buthelezi has let it be known that he considers the "opportunities" as being obtaining all of Natal Province including Durban's port facilities.³¹ He has continually stressed that no meaningful change is being made in South Africa's rigidly-segregated society, despite claims of the country's liberal whites. He believes Prime Minister Vorster's separate development strategy, through the establishment of ethnic enclaves, to be aimed at maintaining white supremacy. Like Prime Minister Matanzima, Buthelezi envisions a federal union of autonomous multi-racial states throughout southern Africa, wherein all races share economic and political powers.

Although Buthelezi attacks the white racism in South Africa, he is not anti-white--he is also critical of the Black Power movements among African students. But,

being a pragmatist, he sees that consolidating black living areas and giving black representation in the South African Parliament are the only logical alternatives to civil disobedience. He also warns that the rise of Black Power has become such a threat to South Africa's apartheid that "changes in policy toward blacks must come or they [the students] will smash the economy,"³² and "racial violence will increase until South African blacks are recognized as full citizens."³³

Once assuming the timid position that he was "operating from powerlessness and that the . . . tribal home policy may provide an opportunity to maintain human dignity,"³⁴ Buthelezi now calls for a more activist and challenging role for blacks in South Africa. In so-doing he rejects the concept of black self-governing areas separate from the white power centers. In what has been deemed by some as his most important speech, at Johannesburg in March, 1976, Buthelezi urged all blacks to assert themselves as a united force, and proposed a series of national conventions in the hope of forcing the Nationalist government to listen. To the Nationalist Party, this speech announced a new "hard-line" approach by Buthelezi to expand his tribal party, the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement, into a nationwide mass movement. In so-doing, Buthelezi was attempting to speak as a leader of all South African blacks, not just the Zulus, and denounced apartheid. He stated that South Africa is "one country,

with one destiny and one economy, . . . [and] black nationalism will be the determinant force in South African politics."³⁵ As evidence of his growing support in his endeavors, the South African white opposition Progressive Reform Party announced in January of this year that it may form an alliance with Inkatha. Additionally, the outlawed African National Congress and Pan-Africanist Congress have both expressed interest in the movement.

Buthelezi's first tasks were the unification of his people politically and in a physical sense. He has accomplished the former. In the January, 1976 conference of Inkatha, he won overwhelming support from the Zulus, including King Goodwill, who promised his support, while dissociating himself from the rival Inola Zulu Party.³⁶ In the area of physical unification, Buthelezi is doing as much as apartheid will allow. This includes urging development of backward rural areas, and maintaining close ties with activist urban Zulus. He is not, however, about to attempt any exclusion policies--he guarantees equal rights to all whites and coloreds who wish to become citizens of Zululand.

Viewed by whites as radical, and by young urban blacks as not radical enough, Buthelezi is "now the most prominent black leader in South Africa."³⁷ His spirit and determination are intense--his means, peaceful. Opposing violence as a means of achieving civil rights for Zulus, he is a symbol of peaceful black aspirations in South Africa. His one hand is being grasped enthusiastically

from the poverty-stricken and disorganized Zulus. The other he has extended to the white community--not palm up, seeking charity, but on an equal level, offering the handclasp of friendship.³⁸

A Comparison of Leadership

One of the great questions of history is whether situations make leaders or whether it is the completely accidental appearance of a certain man that makes history go one way or another. The nature of South Africa's leaders may provide the most important single clue not only to the explosive forces at work but to the nature of the often diverse people of South Africa themselves. Each leader draws strength from the land and people from which he comes but each gives of his own character and personality to stimulate others and forge the nature of his homeland.

Destiny has now turned international attentions toward South Africa, whose peoples are attempting to obtain political goals that have been beyond their reach up to the present time. Behind the past and present turmoil in South Africa has long remained a great determination to be free. With this determination as a driving force, the people of black South Africa have continually turned to other black South Africans for the unifying leadership to deliver them from the system of apartheid.

A pattern seems to have evolved, guided by the policies of apartheid, and carried out by the four prominent Africans discussed. These are the kinds of men to whom,

in their own times, their people have turned for the unifying leadership so desperately desired. Albert Luthuli, a devout Christian and man of peace, after failing in his constant negotiation with the white minority government in South Africa, in the end turned in support of defiance, for which he was banned. Nelson Mandela--young, spirited and restless--immediately seized the opportunity presented by such men as Luthuli, and carried defiance to open violence, for which he was imprisoned. Prime Minister Kaiser Matanzima--persevering, untiring and determined in his quest for independence for his people--almost immediately seized what little political opportunity was afforded him, and carried it through to its ultimate. Unwilling to relinquish what power he has been able to usurp from the white South African government, Matanzima is intent on creating a conservative, isolationist environment for his Xhosa-speaking countrymen. This he is doing in order to foster their development, and the development of their homeland--to the utmost of his ability. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi--brilliant, temperate and pragmatic--initially defied the Nationalist government. Later, however, realizing the futility of his position, and seeing little result in the efforts of organizations such as the Black Peoples' Convention and the South African Student Organization, Buthelezi entered into detente with the white minority government. He has been slowly and meticulously using the established white organizational framework to his advantage,

and to the advantage of his people. All four men have had large followings in all of their endeavors. Luthuli carried the respect of the older, more traditional African elite, broadening this respect, ultimately, to the international arena. Mandela, due to his youth and vitality, drew support primarily from African students and young, restless African laborers. Buthelezi and Matanzima, men fortunate enough to have ascended to positions of influence at a time when world opinion would no longer tolerate the past deeds of the South African government, have demonstrated to all Africans an ability to lead them from their poverty and oppression, and for this they have sworn their allegiance.

The four pre-eminent leaders do have in common a deeply-ingrained loyalty to their ancestors and the continent on which they were born, creating a strong consciousness of, and a commitment to, freedom, majority government, mutual co-existence, and peace.

Future Black Leadership:
A Summary and Conclusion

In discussing the pattern of black South African leadership which it is believed has evolved within the confines of the white South African apartheid structure, one must wonder if a future monarch style of leadership might possibly come from the ranks of black South Africa.

We define monarchical tendencies . . . to be a combination of at least four elements of political style . . . the quest for aristocratic effect--takes the form of social ostentation; it means a partiality for splendid attire, for large expensive cars, for.

palatial accomodation, and for other forms of conspicuous consumption . . . the personalization of authority--sometimes going toward the extent of inventing a title for the leader--and occasionally the title is almost literally royal . . . the sacralization of authority--either person or office or institution . . . the quest for a royal historical identity--arising out of a vague feeling that national dignity is incomplete without a splendid past; glory of past is then conceived in terms of ancient kingly achievement.³⁹

In reviewing the previous discussions of four politically prominent black South Africans, one is able to discern the presence of certain of these elements in the political styles of all four leaders. However, it may be seen that the political style of the most outspoken of these leaders--Chief Gatsha Buthelezi--contains all of the elements identified as comprising monarchical tendencies. In the ensuing discussion, further elaboration will provide a cogent foundation for the theory that, should a black South African become able to ascend to the position of Prime Minister of South Africa, such an individual would display the characteristics of Chief Buthelezi. It is for this reason that the following discussion will center on Buthelezi and certain of his styles of living and political philosophies. This is done in order to identify the typology of a possible emergent black state leader in the Republic of South Africa.

The Quest for Aristocratic Effect: In December, 1972 Chief Buthelezi took pride in creating a far-reaching controversy when he danced with the white wife of a South African journalist at the Capetown Press Club.⁴⁰ A sharp display

of social ostentation, the incident occurred during South Africa's important parliamentary by-election campaigns. Other displays of ostentation occur during traditional Zulu tribal events, when Buthelezi revels in dressing in his traditional tribal clothing, and presiding at functions alongside Zulu traditional King Goodwill. However, Buthelezi's normal dress consists of smartly-tailored but inexpensive West European suits and casual attire. These he wears in an apparent attempt to identify with contemporary Western political leaders.

The Personalization and Sacrilization of Authority: It was unnecessary for Chief Buthelezi to invent a title for himself and link it with royalty. Buthelezi, of royal Zulu descent--and therefore of royal Zulu historical identity--is a Chief of a tribe steeped in the traditions of courage, cunning, and ancient African culture. Additionally, he is Chief Executive Officer of the Zulu Territorial Authority--the Kwazulu homeland--and officially recognized as such not only by the South African government, but by international political factions as well.

Tribal Origins of Political Style: Within the traditional Zulu cooperative structure of kinship and common ownership, there still existed room for individual effort and individual rewards for such effort. Therefore, in addition to status based on age and custom, there is social status accruing from education and material possessions. Chief

Buthlezi, due to his race unable to purchase a dwelling or land on which to build a dwelling, has obtained what material possessions the system of apartheid has allowed-- clothing and a European automobile. A graduate of Fort Hare University, his education has been demonstrated by eloquent speeches, lectures and presentations, as well as an astute awareness of political maneuverability and manipulation.

Although Buthlezi has not outwardly displayed a partiality for large, expensive automobiles and expensive attire, he is possessed of a realization that to do so would remove him from his identification with the common man, whose support he admittedly requires--and receives.

The anteceding discussion has not been presented to provide a checklist for identification of future monarchs. Nor has the intent been to demonstrate the requirements for a successful political career within "black" or "white" South Africa. What has been presented-- is a postulate--albeit highly theoretical in nature--of what characteristics might be present in the political style of a future black Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa. Conversely, it is postulated that, should such an ascension by a black South African become a reality, Chief Gatsha Buthlezi possesses the requisite characteristics, following, and determination to cause such a venture to be successful.

CHAPTER 5 NOTES

¹Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. vii-viii.

²Marion Friedmann, ed., I Will Still Be Moved: Reports from South Africa (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1963), pp. 79-80.

³Albert Luthuli, "Africa and Freedom," Africa's Freedom (London: Union Books, 1964), pp. 9-10.

⁴Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 122.

⁵Luthuli, op. cit., p. 19.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 232.

⁸Mandela, op. cit., p. xi.

⁹Ibid., pp. 19-20.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 182.

¹¹Ibid., p. 189.

¹²Mary Benson, South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), p. 89.

¹³Mandela, op. cit., p. xiv.

¹⁴Editorial, Wall Street Journal, August 27, 1973.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., August 8, 1972.

17 Ibid.

18 Editorial, The Economist, March 20, 1976.

19 Ibid.

20 Edwin S. Munger, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of the Zulus (BSA-1-'71), Fieldstaff Reports, Central and Southern Africa Series, Vol. XV, No. 9, 1971, p. 1.

21 Ibid.

22 Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, The Past and Future of the Zulu Nation, Munger Africaner Library Notes, No. 10, 1972, p. I.

23 New York Times, Final Late City ed., June 29, 1971.

24 Ibid.

25 Buthelezi, loc. cit.

26 Ibid., p. II.

27 Ibid.

28 Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., November 8, 1971.

29 Washington Post, January 10, 1974, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

30 New York Times, Final Late City ed., November 27, 1972.

31 Washington Post, January 16, 1977.

32 Washington Post, August 9, 1973, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

33 Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., August 16, 1976.

³⁴New York Times, June 29, 1971, loc. cit.

³⁵Editorial, The Times [London], March 15, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

³⁶The Times [London], January 17, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

³⁷Editorial, Christian Science Monitor, Eastern ed., November 26, 1973.

³⁸Joseph Judge, "The Zulus: Black Nation in a Land of Apartheid," National Geographic, Vol. 140, No. 6, 1971, p. 773.

³⁹Ali A. Mazrui, "The Monarchical Tendency in African Political Culture," Governing in Black Africa: Perspectives on New States, Marian E. Doro and Newell H. Stultz, eds. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 18.

⁴⁰Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., December 3, 1972.

Chapter 6

THE FUTURE OF MAJORITY RULE: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

A discussion of the prospects of majority rule in South Africa is now in order. South Africa is:

One of the areas in the world where peaceful progress is constantly threatened with disruption, because the application of apartheid and white minority rule in any form is irreconcilable with African determination to achieve majority rule.¹

In order to provide for the broadest assessment of the future of majority rule, the various parties possibly affecting this outcome, both internal and external, will be examined prior to the formulation of any conclusions.

The Role of the Third World

Currently, the role of the many Third World nations in supporting the black South African struggle appears to be limited to either vocal condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies or assisting in the peripheral build-up and training of black nationalist guerrilla factions. Vocal condemnation includes United Nations resolutions recommending economic and financial boycotts of South Africa, bans on sports competition with South African athletes, condemnation of Israel for maintaining military and economic links with South Africa, and calls on the United Nations Security Council to enforce its arms embargo.² These vocal condemnations, although maintaining international awareness of the plight of black South Africa, continue to

accomplish little toward establishing majority rule in South Africa. As previously discussed, the Organization of African Unity, although in agreement in their criticism of apartheid, in July, 1976 reached a new low in interest and action on the parts of its member nations. In addition, the OAU Liberation Committee remains a fragmented, economically impotent skeleton of support for South Africa's nationalist organizations. The United Nations, although having excluded South Africa in 1974 from participation in its General Assembly, and refusing to recognize the Trans-kei as an independent entity, continues to remain a mere focal point of verbal condemnation.

South African nationalist guerrilla movements continue to be provided with training bases and instructors by Third World countries; notably bases are provided by Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique, and instructors are provided by Cuba.³ However, South Africa's military capabilities are of such an ominous nature that widespread guerrilla warfare does not appear as a viable means of forcing majority rule on the white minority South African government. Twenty years ago, one of South Africa's shrewdest liberal educators, Julius Lewin, wrote an essay entitled, "No Revolution Around the Corner."⁴ He still feels that the title applies.

The Role of the Superpowers

The Soviet Union and China. The root of the conflict in

South Africa is entirely indigenous--that is, it arises from the determination of black Africans to bring an end to the white minority regime. Similarly, most African leaders would much prefer, in their own interests, to see this come about through nonviolent means. They will, nonetheless, support violence if no other avenue appears open. Most African leaders, however, are hostile to communism and strongly opposed to the intrusion of "big-power" politics in South Africa. Yet, because they see white racism as a larger menace to them than communism, they will welcome anti-Western forces in the struggle against the current government.

Neither the Soviet Union nor China has had any conflicting interest or ideological difficulties in wholeheartedly supporting the African drive against white minority rule.⁵ In assessing this possible support for the African drive in South Africa, it is necessary to take into account the deep-seated rivalry between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, and the way that rivalry interacts with the interests of South Africa. Certain authorities on African affairs feel that "in the Third World the Sino-Soviet rivalry with each other has become more important to them than either's rivalry with the West."⁶

The clearest evidence of the primary importance of the Sino-Soviet contest for Third World influence was provided by propaganda circulated in the developing nations by Moscow and Peking during the Angola crisis of 1976. Both

sides were concerned almost entirely with discrediting each other and only to a minor degree with attacking "United States and Western imperialism." Each side strained to convince the Third World that the role of the other in Angola was proof of a clear design to achieve "world domination."

In this contest for allegiance, the Soviets are concerned to defend themselves against what they regard as "Peking's false doctrine about the role of the two super-powers. . . . A cunning trick of the Maoists who dream of dominating the world."⁷ Moscow's defensive line is typified by statements similar to the following:

The present leadership of the PRC are taking considerable pains in order to justify the so-called vanguard role of China in the world revolutionary process and to represent itself as one of the truest and most consistent allies of the Afro-Asian and Latin American peoples in their struggles for national liberation against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism.

The Chinese counterattack these assertions by making such statements as the following:

People have become increasingly aware that in contending for hegemony with the other superpowers, the Soviet revisionists stoop to anything to frenziedly penetrate and expand in Africa in a vain attempt to replace the old colonialism.

At present, Soviet influence in South Africa is limited to arms, training and military advisory support for the outlawed African National Congress. The Peoples' Republic of China is presently limited to arms, training and military advisory support for the outlawed Pan-

Africanist Congress. As a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the two nationalist organizations continue to function separately and compete with each other for recruits. This decreases their effectiveness considerably. Additionally, the Chinese and Soviet contingents to the United Nations continue to verbally condemn the South African government and its apartheid policies.

In the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union is likely to engage in the most actively aggressive pursuit of influence in South Africa. This is primarily motivated by a desire to "contain" the spread of Chinese influence. It is difficult to describe the long-term interests of China in South Africa. China remains in the midst of internal governmental unrest in the wake of the recent death of Mao Tse-tung. Its principle short-term interest is, as previously described, to increase their influence in the Third World as a means of reducing the Soviet Union's world role.

The Soviets and the Chinese will both continue to focus on their rivalry for influence with the liberation movements. Beyond this, their support of the drive for majority rule in South Africa appears to be focused on verbal condemnation in the near future.

The United States: The policies of the United States in regard to South Africa are governed by four basic elements: the United States opposes the continuation in Africa of

systems based on racial discrimination; the Nation does not seek involvement in African internal affairs or any special influence in Africa; it is the policy of the United States to recognize special obligations to assist in the economic development of Africa; and the United States is concerned with keeping the continent free of great-power rivalry. The United States wants no military allies, no spheres of influence, and no big-power competition in Africa.¹⁰

United States' influence in helping to establish majority rule in South Africa has been limited to strong vocal condemnation of South Africa's policy of apartheid and continuing its 1962 embargo on the sale of arms, whether from governmental or commercial sources, which could be used by the South African government to enforce apartheid. The United States voted against the United Nations General Assembly resolution which, in July, 1974 excluded South Africa from participation in the General Assembly. The United States' position was, and continues to be, that the practical result of expelling South Africa from the United Nations would be to remove its government from the one place where the full weight of world opinion could be brought to bear on it. It is the United States' belief that apartheid can be ended, not by the contraction of relationships between South Africans--black, white, or Colored--and the rest of the world, but through the enlargement of those relationships, and by the full and continued exposure

of the South African government to world opinion. Further, it is believed that ending apartheid will not be achieved by any one or another dramatic action, but only by the steady and repeated impact of the mobilized conscience of the world community.

Future United States influence in South Africa, expanding upon an already-established base, has the possibility of taking on several forms. The United States currently has limited interests in cooperation with the regime in Pretoria. United States investment in South Africa is approximately \$800 million. Nearly a quarter of this investment is portfolio investment, with another quarter being locally-generated profits, reinvested. Unfortunately, gold's continuing monetary role is an inhibiting factor in dealing strongly with Pretoria, but not an overriding one.

There exists a school of thought which believes that United States and Western investment in South Africa constitutes a form of support for that country and implicitly for the status quo there. The United States' economic involvement may force a difficult choice in the long-run. If no satisfactory way can be found to use economic leverage to encourage internal political change in the Republic, the United States may have to choose between its interests in South Africa and in the rest of the continent. Additionally, because Moscow and Peking are the main outside supporters of liberation, the West could possibly tumble into the

so-called "Unholy Trinity" camp. In the short-run, the independence of the homelands will create other dilemmas. The recognition of the homelands as independent nations could enable the United States to pour in economic aid to South Africa's blacks. While some black South African leaders are asking American investors to slow down investments in South Africa, Kwazulu Chief Gatsha Buthelezi feels that foreign investors will provide jobs in the Bantu homelands, thereby providing freedom of opportunities for blacks. He maintains that, rather than withdrawing from South Africa, American companies should give black South Africans a stake in their investments.¹¹ On the other hand, United States support of what is at present a highly inequitable scheme to bulwark the policy of separate development could once again place the United States on the side of the status quo and against those seeking change and justice. As previously discussed, the Organization of African Unity is at the moment strongly opposed to official recognition of the homelands.

Positively, beyond banning new investment outside the homelands in South Africa, the United States could be instrumental in applying pressure to South African sensitivities. Religion plays an important role in white South Africa; so does sports. Whites would feel deeply about a total ban on South African participation in international games and athletics. Americans could demonstrate sympathetic solidarity with the courageous English-language press

and the restless student bodies of South Africa. The South African reaction to a firmer United States stand would preferably be, not retaliation, but diplomatic efforts to redress a diplomatic defeat. For the time being, a firm United States commitment to majority rule seems enough, although this could change if the guerrilla conflict escalates. It might seem, on balance, that the United States' policies during the transition of South Africa to majority rule would focus on economic aid and political pressures on South Africa.

The Role of Internal Factions

In light of the foregoing discussions, it would appear that the role of factions within South Africa itself are exerting, and will continue to exert, the strongest influence in establishing majority rule and removing apartheid from South Africa.

White South Africa. The Afrikaner officials who rule South Africa continue to talk as if they are sure they can hold on forever. But self-doubt, which Afrikaner intellectuals used to call "a luxury we cannot afford,"¹² appears to be beginning to spread. Seven years ago, at the beginning of a self-imposed exile in London, liberal educator Julius Lewin could confidently, if unhappily, repeat:

In South Africa today, most people do still behave as if they felt that, with all its weaknesses, the country were a going concern. Only a small minority thinks otherwise, and even their actions commonly belie their fears.¹³

Today Lewin has changed his view:

The ruling white people are beginning to lose faith in the permanence of the whole system of government, including racial subjugation. Loss of faith by itself does not produce deep economic or social change. This first serious loss of faith is not the end, but the beginning of a long, long process that will bring the change men have sought for so long.¹⁴

The most important voices urging peaceful compromise with black aspiration come now, ironically, from within the increasingly urbanized and business-oriented Afrikaner community (see Appendix C for a discussion of the foundations behind white South African beliefs concerning apartheid). Class structures unknown to their rural forebears are developing in the community and making some Afrikaners more flexible in their approaches to race. This "new breed" of Afrikaner business entrepreneur is becoming upset at the restrictions apartheid places on the ability to use capital and labor freely, and at the damage racial disturbances are doing to the economy and the international image of South Africa. "The separate development concept has got to be redesigned and redefined. . . . We have to find peaceful ways to head off bloodshed." So stated multimillionaire banker Jan Marais, who is establishing himself as a type of "Great White Hope" for Afrikaner liberals who want what they see as a more sophisticated Afrikaner approach on race to prevail.¹⁵ Prominent Afrikaners argue that their particular culture can best survive by adopting a broader definition of "Western." To do this, they must drop the most obvious features of

racial discrimination and offer a more equitable political and economic option to blacks and persons of mixed ancestry.

The National Party government has begun to say for the first time that racial discrimination is wrong, and is establishing a climate of acceptance by letting a few politically non-vital barriers fall. The changes affect petty apartheid--the set of restrictions imposed on blacks who come into daily contact with whites because of their jobs. "We can have an integrated economic population in the context of the commercial core of an urban area," a National Party spokesman recently said.¹⁶ Government spokesmen have also recently made it clear, however, that the government will push ahead with grand apartheid--now rebaptized "separate development" because of the international stigma attached to its original title. Apartheid "is not an ideology nor a dogma. It is a method along which we are moving, and subject to fundamental reassessment," said Professor Gerrit Viljoen, the new head of the once reactionary, powerful and secret Broederbond organization. It is this organization which originally developed apartheid but is now drifting toward the liberal position in Afrikaner racial politics.¹⁷

The main pillars on which the South African government's policies are based are not going to deviate in the near future. Bantu Administration and Development Minister M. C. Botha has lately stated the official policy of the ruling National Party, which:

Knows precisely what path to take for the future.
. . . As far as we are concerned we have a policy, we are not seeking a policy and there is no question about the political future of the country.

The two most radical changes in separate development being debated within the South African government today are "giving" urban Africans elected councils in the areas where they live, which will have control over their everyday lives, and apartheid's restrictions on the coloreds, the majority of whom speak the Afrikaner's Dutch dialect and identify culturally and ancestrally with the Afrikaners rather than the English speakers of the white minority. At present, solutions to these dilemmas do not appear to be on the foreseeable horizon.

Although it has not been publicly joined, the important debate within Afrikanerdom is between those who believe there is still time for evolutionary politics and others who think time has run out on routine politics as defined by the Afrikaner leaders. This growing questioning of apartheid by Afrikaners is one of the two implicit admissions that it is failing to provide the Afrikaners with a "moral alternative" to the use of force in containing black nationalism. The other implicit, and more important, admission of failure is the escalating violence the government is directing against its black subjects. In this respect, in some aspects the government has taken on the air of a junta rather than the Westminster-style cabinet that it says it is. Seemingly in support of this image, one of the

bills to be introduced during South Africa's current parliamentary session, which opened at the end of January of this year (and has been termed the "most important session in history"), is a new criminal procedures bill. The bill, with 350 clauses, is intended to strengthen police and judicial powers.¹⁹

In light of the foregoing discussion, it appears as though the South African government will not, in the immediate future, alter the overall policy of apartheid, or separation of the races. This appears true even though the government recognizes a somewhat urgent requirement to alter its oppressive policies. Afrikaner intellectuals often refer to this determination as an equivalent to what has been called Israel's "Masada complex." In 72 A.D., the Jews chose to stand and die in the Judean town of Masada rather than surrender to the Romans.²⁰ South African President Nicholas Diederichs has openly admitted that South Africa is on the brink of another "Blood River" that could be the most vicious battle in the country's history.²¹ One concerned young Afrikaner editor has emphasized that, "We've got no more than two years to decide whether to shoot it out or to settle."²²

Black South Africa. Despite numerous attempts at peaceful detente, the confrontation between the forces of liberation and the forces of white supremacy in South Africa is likely to result in armed conflict--a view held not only by many

African leaders, but throughout the remainder of the world. As an example, the bureaucrats who administer the system of discrimination and control known as apartheid help keep long-standing and frequently explosive tribal rivalries alive within the black majority by assigning urban housing on a tribal basis. However, a small but influential black middle class, sharing common economic interests and educational backgrounds, is beginning to foster a united front within the urban areas. These members of a "new tribe" coalescing in the industrial centers of South Africa are doing so under the contradictory demands of a modern economy that needs their skills and under apartheid's restrictions on their abilities to educate and house themselves and to use their labor and capital freely. Their common attachments outweigh the old tribal loyalties and the rural culture that were binding forces for previous African generations.

Moderates of both races previously assumed that the middle class would be an important bridge between black and white in attempts to evolve peacefully toward a multi-racial society. Now, the sharp and specific frustrations of the middle class are feeding black nationalist sentiment and the recent urban uprisings. Much of the new political turbulence of South Africa flows from the blocked aspirations of this racial economic interest group, whose education and affluence are rising faster than the outlets available to them. It is obvious that greater bloodshed

and the beginning of serious urban terrorism are likely if radical changes are not made by the government.

The new black challenge to white power across the region has all but destroyed hope for the kind of peaceful evolution into a multi-racial society long held by leaders like Nelson Mandela and the late Albert Luthuli. Although present leaders like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and Prime Minister Kaiser Matanzima are continuing to strive for a peaceful solution, some form of race warfare, a seemingly unrealistic specter six years ago, is suddenly a chillingly real possibility.

On January 30, 1972 Edward du Cann, a member of the British Conservative Party and prominent in the British business world, addressing the House of Commons on his return to Britain from southern Africa, reported that the Africans were determined more than ever to rule themselves. He said, "the risk of savage racial war in South Africa is real. . . . not some distant amorphous thing."²³ Concerning this prospect, Mazisi Kunene, a member of the outlawed African National Congress, stated in August, 1976 that, as Prime Minister Vorster's concessions to blacks have been nominal and have not dealt with the real issues of apartheid, "South Africa will soon face an outbreak of organized guerrilla warfare."²⁴ In speaking of the June, 1976 riots in Soweto, and the current tension within South Africa in general, Chief Buthelezi has additionally stated, "I shudder for my country and I shudder for all my peoples."²⁵

Apartheid is viewed as the ultimate insult, not only to every African, but to every black man wherever he may be. Perhaps men such as Chief Luthuli, Mandela, Prime Minister Matanzima and Chief Buthelezi within South Africa will gain greater future power to undermine the government's policies than hitherto. Astonishingly, there is still a reservoir of good will and faith toward whites among adult, educated Africans. There is still a strong chance of reaching a multi-racial compromise and sharing, if the white leadership will seek it. The only new factor in the struggle for African democratic rights, which has been unsuccessfully waged to date, is the emergence of the leaders of the homelands--such as Prime Minister Matanzima and Chief Buthelezi. It may be that the very logic of apartheid itself can be turned against the practice of white supremacy. As Chief Buthelezi stated in a speech to black residents of Soweto on the 1976 anniversary of the Sharpsville Massacre, "Justice will prevail and the apartheid government of South Africa will fall."²⁶ Just how and when this will occur remains to be seen.

A Final Note

At first glance, the South African racial conflict seems to be presently escalating into war--which may be alleviated and foreshortened by pressure and eventual negotiation, but cannot be forestalled. Currently, intervention appears to be left primarily to the communist bloc.

Like Moscow and Peking, the West is discouraged by the disunity among nationalist movements and especially by the personal ambitions almost unrelated to policy on which this disunity is founded. Ultimately, decisions on future intervention will probably depend on how much strength the Africans themselves can bring to bear.

Most outsiders, however, including exiled black South African intellectuals, feel a multi-racial solution must somehow be possible. This would mean dismantling the black job ceiling, the "race tax"--large wage differentials--and the segregated budget with its black-subsidized facilities for non-Africans. It would also mean giving blacks freedom of movement, property rights and a choice of jobs. Furthermore, such actions would call for a black majority in a parliament where there are now no blacks, no Asians and no Euraficans. "Integrating" a majority community, comprising 69 per cent of the population, would also have to occur as well as persuading white unionists to accept a white meritocracy. Despite the necessity of such above-noted occurrences, it is probable that whites would prefer a poorer, smaller, all-Brahmin state--or emigration--to a multi-racial, prosperous South Africa in which they were no better off than the other castes.²⁷

In pursuit of these goals, the South African blacks are clearly engaged in some astute and admirable political maneuvering. If any good does come out of the unhappy situation in South Africa, it seems likely it will be less

the result of the far-away critics--offering mere verbal condemnation--than of the political pursuits of men like Prime Minister Matanzima and Chief Buthelezi.

On balance, however; if one scans the present in search of the future of South Africa, the following conclusions emerge. Over the short term, the present patterns of white dominance will continue, but over the intermediate term, the subsystem may be reduced in scope through policies of petty apartheid without any fundamental alteration of the remaining portions of the system. Over the longer term, it seems unlikely that majority control will come to South Africa. There is currently no evidence that the African forces bent on the elimination of apartheid are gaining strength at a rate sufficiently meaningful to challenge, let alone overcome, the present military and economic strength of the government of the Republic of South Africa.

CHAPTER 6 NOTES

¹Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 141.

²Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., November 10, 1976

³Colin Legum, "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, 54:745-762, July, 1976.

⁴Jim Hoagland, "South Africa: How Many Blacks are Whites Ready to Kill," Washington Post, January 16, 1977, p. A25, col. 4.

⁵Hoagland, op. cit., p. A25, col. 1. A key lesson of the Middle East for 28 years, of Angola in 1976 and of Rhodesia now is that if one superpower is committed to change and the other superpower is not committed to halting it, no matter how violent the change, the change will occur.

⁶Legum, loc. cit.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 752.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Information for the Armed Forces, "U.S. Policy: Africa," Information Guidance Series, No. 7-22 (Rev. 1), November, 1975.

¹¹Business Week, June 8, 1974, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

¹²Jim Hoagland, "New Era of Black Defiance Jolts Afrikaner Complacency," Washington Post, January 9, 1977, p. A16, col. 2.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Jim Hoagland, "Afrikaners Split Over Apartheid," Washington Post, January 11, 1977, p. A12, col. 4.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. A12, col. 2.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. A12, col. 1.

¹⁸ Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., August 8, 1971.

¹⁹ Robin Wright, "South Africa Parliament: No Major Initiatives," Washington Post, January 22, 1977, p. A1, col. 2.

²⁰ Jim Hoagland, "Whites Get Taste of Fear," Washington Post, January 13, 1977, p. A20, col. 3.

²¹ Ibid. The Afrikaners' historic reference point of violence is the victory in which the Boers killed 3,000 Zulu warriors in a few hours on December 16, 1838, while suffering only three wounded.

²² Hoagland, "Afrikaners Split Over Apartheid," op. cit., p. A12, col. 5.

²³ Rubin and Weinstein, op. cit., p. 142.

²⁴ Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

²⁵ Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., August 29, 1976.

²⁶ Editorial, Los Angeles Times, May 2, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

²⁷ Russell Warren Howe, "War in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, 48:162-165, January, 1962.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

The history of white influence in South Africa has been long and controversial. In order to provide additional insight into the foundations of this influence, the following discussion is offered as a supplement to Chapter 1.

Jan van Riebeck, an employee of the Dutch East India Company, landed at Table Bay, South Africa in 1652 and founded a resupply station for the company's vessels transiting between Europe and Asia. German and Dutch burghers and artisans were brought to Table Bay from 1652 to 1717 to guard the station from cattle rustlers and French attackers during the war with Louis XIV.¹ These burghers consequently joined with previously-freed company burghers to form a permanent community. Additionally, a number of French immigrants fled Louis XIV's wrath and joined with the German and Dutch peoples thus causing an early amalgamation of white European culture and influence.

By 1688 there were almost six hundred burghers who had established several villages away from the main station at Cape Town. From the outset the company had provided land for building and pasturage to the free burghers to encourage production, but, faithful to the monopolistic principles that governed mercantile thought in the 17th and 18th centuries, standards and prices were fixed by

the company. As a result, many of the burghers rebelled against the company's policies, claiming political freedoms and moving away from the influence of its authority. The tendency to escape from physical hardships was thus borne very early and has since dominated the history of South Africa. Many of the problems of present day South Africa were present in the original Table Bay establishment. When the Hottentots² failed to bring a sufficient amount of cattle to the Cape, Dutch parties were sent out to bring them and their herds to the vessels. Even with the forced replenishment, the Hottentots finally could no longer supply what was demanded and the Dutch were forced to breed their own stock. As the Dutch began to occupy pasture land and "discover" the country themselves, colonization as well as the beginnings of a conflict with the native peoples began to emerge. Initial conflicts generally erupted over either rights to cross territory or cattle rustling, of which both white and black were guilty. These conflicts created a need for a frontier or buffer zone in order to separate the colonists from the Hottentots. However, as soon as such an area was created, natural proliferation of men and cattle made it obsolete and therefore ineffective. The conflict therefore continued.

The Dutch East India Company, in an effort to keep the prices of meat and produce at a low level and to maintain control of its "subjects," prohibited further relocation as well as barter with the Hottentots. This proved to

be futile, as the Boers³ preferred to lead their own lives as they saw fit and moved farther into the interior of the continent. During the latter half of the 18th Century, the Boers' expansion came into contact with the tribal lands of the Bantu at Fish River. Both the Bantu and the Boers were migratory cattle ranchers and therefore greedy for land. 1779 thus marked the beginning of a series of wars between the white colonists and tribal factions which lasted for more than a century over issues involving territorial possession. The Boers, believing the East India Company to be unsympathetic to their interests, finally rebelled against the Dutch authority and in 1795 established the First Boer Republic.

Due to the open conflict between the Dutch and white colonists, the British arrived in 1795 to preserve their shipping lanes to the east. They immediately seized the Cape from the Dutch and had their right to it confirmed in 1814 by the Treaty of Paris. South Africa then became the scene of a struggle for domination between Briton, Boer and African.

British arrival brought with it a great expansion of missionary activity which, among other "reforms" led to the abolition of slavery. However, the Boer character by this time was firmly entrenched. They disliked the British government even more than the previous government of the Dutch East India Company. The British contended that the Boers were "barely literate, with the Bible as their sole

source of learning. Their religion was strongly Old Testament fundamentalist and was used to reinforce the belief in their own superiority."⁴ The Boers in turn complained about the abolition of slavery, missionary support to the African, and the imposition of the English language. The Boers had had enough of the British government, missionaries, and public opinion by 1836. In their estimation, "the Hottentots had been given unheard of rights, the slaves had been freed, and the black men were being treated like white men."⁵ With these thoughts in mind, the Boers started the "Great Trek" northward. This relocation eventually brought them into conflict with the Zulu nation. The move did help to emphasize the difference between Boer and Briton, as well as to open new lands and isolate the Boer from the progressive "outside world." The second and third republics (now the present Transvaal and the Orange Free State, respectively) were established following the "Trek." If it had not been for the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly and gold on the Witwatersrand, isolated Boer existence might have lingered on. The Boer republics, however, turned from oodest agricultural states into rich mining areas. Due to this rapid expansion of economic influence the Boer War soon followed, lasting until 1910 wherein the British signed a liberal treaty of peace, and the Union of South Africa was established.

The Boer War, while uniting South Africa politically, created lasting racial divisions. "More than any other

single event, the Boer War intensified, complicated, and embittered the already ensnarled relationships of Boer, Briton, Bantu and Indian, white and non-white."⁶ During the Boer War, 26,000 Boer women and children perished in British detention camps. The post-war settlement and act of Union, generous though they were, were overshadowed by these atrocities. As a result, the spirit of reconciliation has never flourished, and South Africa has never had a British Prime Minister.

Both Bantu laborers and Boers were migrating to the Witwatersrand cities and mines by 1920. Once there the Boers, though unskilled, were unwilling to compete with the African laborers, and were unable to compete with the British for managerial positions. Consequently, thousands of young workers formed an impoverished white class, adding to the antagonism between Boer and Briton.

General Botha, who formed the first Union, and General Smuts, who replaced Botha in 1919, were South Africa's first two prime ministers. As members of the new Union Party Cabinet of 1910, they both desired to forget the past and build a "new" South Africa with a unified European community of a distinctive character neither Dutch nor English. A herd-core Afrikaner population, however, following a rather aggressive nationalistic line, worked to establish Afrikaans on an official level equal to English. Afrikaner nationalism grew in strength while British prestige failed between and during the two world

wars. The nationalist philosophers believed in and desired the old society based upon inexpensive labor and land. They felt the labor should be provided by a subjugated native⁷ population which was segregated socially and denied political freedoms.

In 1924 General Hertzog became Prime Minister, bringing the Nationalist Party to power. While Prime Minister, Hertzog succeeded in establishing Afrikaans on an equal level with English. In 1943, a general election during the war returned General Smuts to power. Smuts remained as Prime Minister until 1948, at which time he was replaced by Dr. D. W. Malan. The Malan power base was a coalition of the Nationalist and Afrikaner parties. Later this coalition was strengthened by their merging in 1951 under the title of the Nationalist Party. As a result, for the first time since Union a purely Afrikaans-speaking party was in power. The party gained office partly as a result of the system of representation favoring the underpopulated rural areas that were Nationalist strongholds, but mainly on the promise to solve the country's racial problems according to the traditional Boer policy of white ascendancy. It was therefore in 1948 that the doctrine of apartheid first found its official expression in government.

Malan was followed in 1954 by J. G. Strydom, who remained in office and loyal to the doctrine of apartheid until 1958, when he was succeeded by Dr. F. H. Verwoerd. Following the assassination of Verwoerd in 1966, the

Nationalist Party caucus chose B. J. Vorster as Prime Minister, who today enforces the apartheid policies as they have never been before.

APPENDIX A NOTES

¹Thomas Patrick Melady, The White Man's Future in Black Africa (New York: MacFadden-Bartell Corporation, 1962), p. 141.

²The Hottentots (also known as Bushmen) were the original inhabitants of South Africa. They were a very primitive and nomadic people numbering only a few thousand.

³Boer literally means "farmer." It was the old term for South Africans of predominantly Dutch extraction, who lived off the land.

⁴Melady, op. cit., p. 142.

⁵Alan Paton, Hope for South Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958), p. 25.

⁶Norman Phillips, The Tragedy of Apartheid (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1960), p. 18.

⁷This was formerly the official term for the African. The government of South Africa did not believe in dignifying Africans to the extent of allowing them to be called Africans. The term "Kaffir" was also widely used and carried with it a connotation of contempt. The official use of the term "black" is becoming more and more common.

APPENDIX B

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

The following data, while not bearing directly on the discussion presented in Chapter 5, is provided as a supplement to that discussion. The data is included to provide insight into the environmental conditions and styles of living which have produced four of South Africa's most prominent black leaders.

Albert John Kuvumbi Luthuli

Albert Luthuli was born in 1898 in Rhodesia, as his father had taken a job as a Congregationalist Mission interpreter in that nation.¹ His father, the younger brother of Martin Luthuli, Kwazulu Chief until 1921, died when Albert was six months old.⁶ In 1908 with his mother, who took to the task of raising him, and his brother Alfred, Albert moved to the Vryheid District of Northern Natal. There, Seventh Day Adventists asked Alfred to act as their interpreter on a mission. Soon afterward, Albert's mother sent him to Groutville, his father's home, where he became a member of Martin Luthuli's household, and where he began his schooling. Shortly thereafter, Albert's mother and brother moved to Groutville. He remained with them until leaving to attend boarding school at the Ohlange Institute in 1914. In 1915 Albert transferred to a Methodist institution at Edendale, near Pietermaritzburg.

Following his training, Albert left to teach at Blaauw-bosch in the Natal uplands, where he was appointed a principal of an Intermediate School. In 1916, Albert received a bursary (scholarship) to the Higher Teachers' Training Course at Adams College, an American Missionary institution, where he was to spend the next 15 years.³

In 1928 Luthuli became secretary of, and in 1933 president of the African Teachers' Association (ATA). Soon after this, he founded the Zulu Language and Cultural Society as an auxiliary of the ATA. This organization later collapsed. While at Adams, Luthuli became a compulsive football (soccer) fan, and for the next 25 years played what part he could in organizing African and inter-racial sports, to the extent that he was made the first Secretary of the South African Football Association.⁴

While at Adams Luthuli met and married his wife Nokukhanya.

At the end of 1935, Luthuli was elected Chief of the Zulu people--of the Umvoti Mission Reserve--and therefore a member of the government's Native Affairs Department. Soon after becoming Chief, he established and became chairman of the Groutville Cane Growers' Association. In answer to the growing plight of those of his people who were sugar cane growers, Luthuli founded and became chairman of the Natal and Kwazulu Bantu Cane Growers' Associations, thereby "for the first time, . . . able to make united representations to those who controlled [their] interests."⁵ Luthuli continued organizing African sugar

producers until 1949.

Being a devout Christian, Luthuli was throughout his lifetime active in the Dutch Reformed Church. As a member of the Christian Council, he attended the International Missionary Conference in Madras in 1938, and in 1948 was invited to the United States to undertake a lecture tour.⁶

In 1945 Luthuli became active in the African National Congress (ANC), and assumed the position of Executive to Natal President A. W. G. Champion.⁷ In 1949, when the ANC met under newly-elected President-General Moroka, Luthuli became committed to the Program of Action. At the Natal Annual General Meeting of the ANC in 1951, Luthuli replaced Champion as the Natal President.⁸ In July 1951 the National Executive of the Congresses met and appointed a Joint Planning Council to organize cooperation between the different non-white groups. The outcome of this council was the joint organization of the Defiance Campaign, to which Luthuli also became committed. In 1952, as a result of his involvement with the ANC, Luthuli was deposed as Chief of the Umvoti Mission Reserve. In the latter portion of 1952, during the National Conference, Luthuli was elected President-General of the ANC.⁹ In January, 1953 he traveled to the Cape to attend the Executive of the Christian Council where, for a short time, he was detained due to his lack of government permission to remain over 72 hours. In mid-1953, Luthuli

was served his first ban in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, debarring him from entry into all the larger cities and centers of the then Union of South Africa.¹⁰ In the winter of 1954, at the expiration of his ban, and following an address to the Cape Provincial Annual Conference and the opening of the Conference of the Natal Indian Congress in Durban, Luthuli was again debarred. This time he was prevented from attending public meetings, in addition to being confined to the Stanger Magisterial Area in the Lower Tugela District for two years. Early in 1955 Luthuli suffered a stroke and spent two months in McCord's Hospital in Durban.¹¹ At the June, 1955 meeting of the Congress of the People, an ad hoc assembly of the ANC in Johannesburg during which the Freedom Charter was adopted, the Xhosa title Isitwalandwe (applicable to those who have fought courageously in battle) was conferred upon Luthuli, who due to his banishment was not in attendance. In the winter of 1956, following the expiration of his second ban, Luthuli toured Swaziland. Then, in December of that year he was arrested in Groutville on a charge of High Treason.¹² In June, 1957 the charges against him were dropped. Throughout the next few years Luthuli addressed gatherings around South Africa, including many Afrikaner and multi-racial groups. This lasted until May, 1957 when he was presented with a ban of silence and confined to Groutville for five years. In 1960, following the banning of the ANC and the PAC, Luthuli was arrested,

again on charges of High Treason, and detained at the Pretoria Central Police Station.¹³ In August of that year, Luthuli was presented with a suspended sentence and a fine, which was paid by his supporters.

Luthuli remained in Groutville until December, 1961. At that time he travelled to Oslo University to accept the 1960 Nobel Prize for Peace, only to return to banishment. In 1964, at the age of 66, he was again confined to Groutville for five years. Albert Luthuli died a banished man in 1967.

Nelson Mandela

Nelson Mandela was born in the Transkei, near Umtata, in 1918.¹⁴ The eldest son of a Tembu Chief, his father died when Mandela was a boy of 12. As was the custom, his upbringing and education were taken over by the Paramount Chief. At the age of 16 Mandela became a student at Fort Hare University College. Following this education, he studied by correspondence to gain an arts degree, enrolled for a law degree at the University of the Witwatersrand, and became a member of a firm of white attorneys at the Chancellor House in Johannesburg. It was after Witwatersrand that he met and married his wife Winnie.

In 1944 Mandela joined the ranks of the African National Congress, wherein he founded the ANC Youth League with Walter Sisulu, the ANC Secretary-General. Shortly thereafter, Mandela organized and drafted the

"M plan," "a plan for organization on a street basis so that ANC volunteers would be in daily touch with the people, alert to their needs and able to modify them."¹⁵ In 1952, Mandela participated in the Defiance Campaign of the ANC. When the ANC and the PAC were declared illegal in 1960 they were placed on underground footing, and Mandela's "M plan" was effected.

In May, 1961 South Africa was declared a Nationalist Republic. As a counter to a white referendum during which no African was consulted, a strike was called in the name of Nelson Mandela. He then began the life of a political "outlaw," acquiring the legend of the "Black Pimpernel."¹⁶ Following the forceful police and army mobilization against the strike, the Spear of the Nation was formed, and acts of sabotage occurred during and after the second half of 1961. Many of these actions were organized by Mandela.

Mandela was imprisoned following the Sharpville massacre of 1960, only to escape in 1961. In 1962, after being smuggled across the border, Mandela attended the Addis Ababa conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa. He then returned to live underground in South Africa. Seventeen months after he went underground he was arrested by the police following the lead of an informer. Tried for inciting African workers to strike in 1961 and leaving South Africa without a valid passport or permit, Mandela was sentenced to five years

imprisonment at the Pretoria Central Prison.¹⁷ On June 11, 1963 the police raided the underground headquarters of the ANC in Rivonia, and Mandela was taken from his jail cell to join those arrested in the raid facing charges of sabotage and conspiracy to overthrow the government by revolution and by assisting an armed invasion of South Africa by foreign troops. Following the eleven-month trial Mandela was sentenced to life imprisonment on Robben Island, the former leper colony-turned-maximum-security penal island used for South African political prisoners. He remains there today.¹⁸

Kaiser Daliwonga Matanzima

Kaiser Matanzima was born in the Transkei on June 15, 1915 the son of Chief Mhlobo Mvuzo Matanzima Mtirara, ruler of the Emigrant Tembu ethnic group.¹⁹ When Matanzima was a youth of 17, his father died, therefore placing him in the way of power early. An uncle reigned over the Tembu people until Matanzima reached majority age. The Tembu tribe financed his education at a missionary school and later at Fort Hare University College, where he graduated in 1939 with a degree in Roman Law and political science. Following his education, the South African government installed Matanzima as Chief of a Tembu clan in 1940, and in 1942 moved him to the Transkeian Territorial Council. In 1949 he resigned to become a clerk at a Umtata law firm in order to prepare

for his bar exam. Matanzima passed the bar exam in 1948, while at the same time receiving the Cape Law Society Prize for his outstanding score.²¹

Matanzima reentered active political life in 1954 as a member of the Transkeian Council. In 1958 he was installed as regional chief of the Emigrant Tembuland. In 1961 he became Chairman of the Transkeian Territorial Authority. In 1963 Matanzima was elected to Chief Ministership of the Transkei Territory. When the Transkei became South Africa's first independent nation on October 26, 1976 Matanzima was elected Prime Minister of the newly-independent state.²²

Matanzima has been married three times, and divorced twice. His present wife Nozuko is 42 years old, and remains at home caring for their six children, ranging in age from 8 to 19 years old.²³

Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi was born near a Protestant Mission in Phindangane (Come Again) in 1926.²⁴ The son of Matole Buthelezi and Princess Magogo, both of Zulu Royal descent, Buthelezi was raised by his mother at home until the age of 2½, in Zulu tradition. He was then sent to the Royal Kraal for his education, where he remained until entering Fort Hare University College.²⁵

Buthelezi's wife Irene is a "city-girl" from Soweto.

APPENDIX B NOTES

¹Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 24.

²Marion Friedmann, ed., I Will Still Be Moved: Reports from South Africa (London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1963), p. 76.

³*Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁴Luthuli, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 129.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 145.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 162.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 223.

¹⁴Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom (New York: Basic Books, 1965), pp. vii-viii.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. xii.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. xiii.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 125-162.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 162-189.

¹⁹Editorial, New York Times, Final Late City ed., October 26, 1976, p. 23F.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Edwin S. Munger, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of the Zulus (ESM-1-'71), Fieldstaff Reports, Central and Southern Africa Series, Vol. XV, No. 9, 1971, p. 2.

²⁵Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, The Past and Future of the Zulu Nation, Munger Africaner Library Notes, No. 10, 1972, p. I.

APPENDIX C

APARTHEID: WHITE SOUTH
AFRICAN BELIEFS

As an adjunct to gaining insight into the current beliefs concerning apartheid as espoused by "white" South Africa, the following discussion is offered as a supplement to the discussion of internal factions in Chapter 6. This discussion will focus on the division within the European community between the Afrikaner and English-speaking white, as well as the division within the Afrikaner element, both concerning the implementation of apartheid

At the core of white South African beliefs concerning the administration of apartheid is the feeling that the policy provides not only an immediate solution to the black-white relationship, but also a long-range, permanent, and complete separation of white and black in South Africa.¹ No less fundamental to the white South African belief is that not only the numerically superior blacks, but all non-whites in South Africa should develop separately. Underlying all white South African beliefs is the fear that his culture, way of life, and biogenetic identity would be undermined if he did not maintain his separateness in his country.² Numbering less than one-fifth of the total population of the country, the white South African intends to do everything in his power to maintain the separation which already exists to prevent

his political, economic, social, or cultural extinction either by force or assimilation.³ While individual views and opinions exist on the part of white South Africans, the separation of the races is a common idea among them, and has become a part of their national philosophy of life.⁴

The general ideas of apartheid development held by white South Africans place the current situation in the second phase of a three-phase program for ultimate and complete separation of the races in all spheres.⁵ The first phase, conflict, involved racial wars. The second phase, guardianship, occurred when "civilized, more highly-developed whites took the uncivilized, underdeveloped blacks under their protection, and began to uplift them."⁶ This phase will end when the Bantu, under white leadership, becomes able to "manage his own affairs in a democratic manner worthy of a civilized human being and without danger to himself."⁷ The final emancipation of the Bantu is the last phase of apartheid in terms of which white and non-white, each within his own homeland, will once again "exist side-by-side as free-flowing units."⁸ The white South African feels that his country's solution to the "racial problem" will serve as a model for the world, recognized for its worth once the last phase has been completed. He defends apartheid primarily on the perceived threat of the Bantu to overwhelm the whites with his numerical superiority.

The general idea of apartheid is accepted by most

white South Africans. However, the whites form a group which is not homogeneous in composition or thought concerning the policy. An important distinction concerning apartheid ideology is the difference between the Afrikaner and the English-speaking whites. The Afrikaners consider themselves "natives" of the land as they and the Bantu arrived at approximately the same time.⁹ The Afrikaner is, in general, more racist and more committed to the apartheid policy. His political party is the ruling Nationalist Party, through which he has endeavored to place into practice his theory of development for the various "nationalities" within the country. The Nationalist Party, which has been in power throughout the history of apartheid, dominates the rival English-speaking predominately white United Party. To the Afrikaner has gone political leadership and public service, while to the English-speaking white has gone industry and commerce. The English-speaking white is a more recent arrival in South Africa, attracted to the country from primarily Western Europe and other African countries with less stable governments, and in general has less of a commitment to apartheid than has the Afrikaner. The two factions rarely socialize, and disagree on several aspects of the apartheid policy.¹⁰

In addition to the ideological distinctions between the Afrikaner and the English-speaking white when examining the white minority power apparatus, a distinction

exists within the ranks of the Afrikaner. Among these peoples there are two major schools of thought concerning apartheid. One school, the "Verkramptes," which in Afrikaans translates to "cramped or narrow-minded," is the more conservative and is critical of Prime Minister Vorster's outward-looking policy of dialogue¹¹ with South Africa's neighboring black nations. The other school, the "Verligtes," which in Afrikaans translates to "enlightened," is the more liberal school, endorses Vorster's policy, and advocates even greater intercourse with South Africa's black neighbors.¹² Current government policy is dominated by the verligte attitude which holds that the "embattled" South Africa should pursue a counter-offensive strategy, first by establishing friendly relations with those neighboring black states which are economically obligated to it, and then proceed into the international arena preaching the validity and merits of apartheid. The verkrampte attitude holds that South Africa should remain with traditional isolationism. However, both the Verligtes and the Verkramptes believe in and defend the apartheid policy. In a sympathetic explanation of the government's policies, Rhodie and Venter state:

As a result of the undesirable socio-economic struggle for existence in our cities, a fast-growing, sometimes aggressive black nationalism, and the rise of modern international "color liberalism," the Afrikaner was obliged again and again to bolster up his unwritten traditional practice of differentiation with more concerted measures.¹³

This has reinforced the belief, held by the majority of white South Africans, that the practice of apartheid "is traditional, since it is hallowed by centuries of development, accepted as natural by 99 per cent of the white population, and enforced by custom as well as by law."¹⁴

APPENDIX C NOTES

¹N. J. Rhoodie and H. J. Venter, Apartheid (Cape Town, South Africa: National Commercial Printers, Ltd., 1960), pp. 22-26.

²*Ibid.*, p. 29.

³Amry Vanderbosch, South Africa and the World (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 25.

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷*Ibid.*

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Douglas Brown, Against the World (Carson City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969), p. 83.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 94. Currently, one of the points of general disagreement between the Afrikaner and the English-speaking white concerns the use of the black labor force. While the Afrikaner emphasizes the temporary use of the Bantu labor force in the economy, the English-speaking white takes a more pragmatic approach. The latter recognizes the need for the permanent force and would allow permanent Bantu settling around white areas to provide this force. The English-speaking white additionally disagrees with the homelands concept. He wants the Bantu to be considered a member of the South African community and develop within it along with the whites, not physically separated from them. Political rights should eventually be granted to the Bantu; while maintaining social and residency parliamentary for the Bantu, but with separate electoral rolls, and the right to vote given only to the "educated" Bantu--these are the English-speaking white beliefs.

¹¹"Dialogue" refers to Vorster's proclaimed willingness to discuss political and economic issues with other

black African governments in spite of their hostilities toward South Africa's apartheid policies.

¹²Vanderbosch, op. cit., p. 266.

¹³Rhodie and Venter, op. cit., p. 212.

¹⁴Vanderbosch, op. cit., p. 54.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

Africa Research Group, The. Race to Power: The Struggle for Southern Africa, New York: Doubleday, 1974.

Ajala, Adegunle. Pan Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974.

A comprehensive survey of a complex, vital and neglected subject which would prove valuable to anyone interested in African affairs. Includes the background, achievements and failures of the movement, using case studies to illustrate the author's thesis.

Arkhurst, Frederick S., ed. Africa in the Seventies and Eighties: Issues in Development, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.

Barber, James. South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

An excellent background source on South African Prime Minister Vorster's "dialogue" policy.

Benson, Mary. South Africa: The Struggle for a Birthright, New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969.

The African Patriots: The Story of the African National Congress of South Africa, Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Press, 1964.

Brown, Douglas. Against the World, Carson City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1969.

Burke, Fred G. Africa's Quest for Order, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.

This study diagnoses the dynamic forces impelling the African liberation movements south of the Sahara, including tribalism, urbanization, racism, nationalism, and the rise of new leaderships.

Buthlezi, Chief Gatsha. The Past and Future of the Zulu Nation, Hunger Africaner Library Notes, No. 10, 1972.

Cervenka, Z. The Organization of African Unity and Its Charter, London: C. Hurst and Company, 1969.

Cox, Richard. Pan-Africanism in Practice, London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

Daggs, Elisa. All Africa, New York: Hastings House, 1970.

de Kock, W. J. History of South Africa, Pretoria: Heer Printing, 1971.

Denoon, Donald. Southern Africa Since 1800, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.

The author has developed the most significant themes in southern Africa since 1800, explaining why and how events there moved diametrically opposite to those on the rest of the continent. Provides insight into the past, present and future problems of the area.

Doro, Marion E. and Newell M. Stultz, eds. Governing in Black Africa: Perspectives on New States, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.

Duffy, James and Robert A. Manners, eds. Africa Speaks, Princeton: Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961.

A collection of essays from various African lands south of the Sahara, with views presented on Africa today and tomorrow.

El-Ayouty, Yassin, ed. The Organization of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

Feit, Edward. African Opposition in South Africa, Stanford, California: The Hoover Institution, 1967.

Fisher, John. The Afrikaners, London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1969.

Friedmann, Marion, ed. I Will Still Be Moved: Reports from South Africa, London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1963.

Gibson, Richard. African Liberation Movements, London: Oxford University Press, 1972.

Giniewski, Paul. The Two Faces of Apartheid, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965.

Grundy, Kenneth W. Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973.

A large-scale systematic study of the international relations of the thirteen territories in southern Africa. A valuable background source for understanding the issues of race and their impact on international politics.

_____. Guerrilla Struggle in Africa: An Analysis and Preview, New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971.

Gunther, John. Inside Africa, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962.

Hance, William A., ed. Southern Africa and the United States, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Four of the foremost authors on Africa assess the factors which bear upon United States' relations with southern Africa in the light of changing attitudes in the United States, in southern Africa, and in independent black Africa.

Hatch, John. Africa Emergent: Africa's Problems Since Independence, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1974.

_____. Africa Today--and Tomorrow, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961.

An excellent albeit dated reference which reveals the problems of the African people in light of their efforts to join the twentieth century as free members.

Hipple, Alex. South Africa, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966.

Herdeck, Donald E. African Authors: A Companion to Black African Writing Vol. I: 1900-1972, Washington: Black Orpheus Press, 1973.

Hoagland, Jim. South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972.

Written by a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting, text discusses the conflicts in South Africa from firsthand observation. Provides an excellent insight into present and future problems of race in the Republic.

Hobart-Houghton, D. The South African Economy, Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1964.

The author provides a comprehensive account of South Africa's advanced industrial economy, supported by factual charts, maps and tables. The impact of political forces on the economy is discussed also.

Hovet, Thomas, Jr. Africa in the United Nations, Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1963.

An analysis of the voting records and voting behaviors of the new African nations, outlining how the new states have used their numbers to influence decisions.

Jacobs, Walter Darnell. African Turmoil and American Interests, New York: American African Affairs Association, Inc., 1976.

Janke, Peter. Southern Africa: End of Empire, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1974.

Karefa-Smart, John, ed. African Conference on Progress Through Cooperation, Kampala, Uganda, 1965, New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, Inc., 1966.

Katzen, Leo, et. al., Africa South of the Sahara, London: Europa Publications, 1973.
A useful source document for information on economic and sociological facts of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Kitchen, Helen. A Handbook of African Affairs, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1964.
The author assumes the status quo in Africa will not be maintained and primarily concerns herself with characterizing and appraising the emergent leaders.

Kotze, D. A. African Politics in South Africa 1964-1974: Parties and Issues, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975.

Kuper, Leo. An African Bourgeoisie, Boston: The Colonial Press, Inc., 1965.

Larkin, Bruce D. China and Africa 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of the Peoples' Republic of China, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971.
An account of China's political and economic activities on the African continent. Provides insightful information for the student of international politics or revolutionary practice.

Legum, Colin, ed. African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents Vol. 3: 1970-1971, New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1971.

_____. African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents Vol. 4: 1971-1972, New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1972.

_____. African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents Vol. 5: 1972-1973, New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1973.

_____. African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents Vol. 6: 1973-1974, New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1974.

Legum, Colin and John Drysdale, eds. African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents Vol. 1: 1968-1969, New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1969.

_____. African Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents Vol. 2: 1969-1970, New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1970.

Legum, Colin. Southern Africa: The Secret Diplomacy of Detente, South Africa at the Crossroads, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975.

Life World Library. South Africa, New York: Time, Inc., 1964.

Luthuli, Albert. "Africa and Freedom," in Africa's Freedom, London: Unver Books, 1964.

_____. Let My People Go, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.

Mandela, Nelson. No Easy Walk to Freedom, New York: Basic Books, 1965.

Marquard, Leo. A Federation of Southern Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

A study of Africa's relationships with the colonial and industrial nations of the West. A highly informative work on the new dimensions, subtleties, and challenges that the Third World presents to the "Great Powers."

_____. The Peoples and Policies of South Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Mazrui, Ali A., ed. Africa in World Affairs: The Next Thirty Years, New York: Joseph Chpaku, 1973.

Melady, Thomas Patrick. Faces of Africa, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964.

An excellent view of the historical setting and evolution of the present political and economic situation in South Africa.

_____. Profiles of African Leaders, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961.

_____. The White Man's Future in Black Africa, New York: MacFadden-Bartell Corp., 1962.

Munger, Edwin S. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of the Zulus, (DSM-1-'71), Fieldstaff Reports, Vol. XV, No. 9, 1971.

Nielson, Waldemar A. African Battleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa, New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965.

_____. The Great Powers and Africa, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969.

Ngubane, Jordan K. An African Explains Apartheid, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963.

A native South African speaks out against apartheid and outlines a program for insuring that all South Africans, regardless of race or belief, may live in harmony.

Nolutshungu, Sam C. South Africa in Africa, New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975.

An extremely interesting and informative discussion of South African Prime Minister Vorster's "dialogue" policy and its impact on the remainder of the continent.

Paton, Alan. Hope for South Africa, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958.

_____. South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of Apartheid, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1958.

Phillips, Norman. The Tragedy of Apartheid: A Journalist's Experiences in the South African Riots, New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1960.

Quigg, Philip W. Africa, London: Praeger Publishers, 1964.

The book is composed of articles chosen from those appearing in Foreign Affairs from 1954 to 1964. Reveals how quickly the points of reference in the discussions of African affairs have changed.

Rhodie, N. J. and H. J. Venter. Apartheid, Cape Town: National Commercial Printers, Ltd., 1960.

Rubin, Leslie and Brian Weinstein. Introduction to African Politics: A Continental Approach, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.

An extremely informative and valuable reference on the developmental background and current political situations throughout the continent. The futures of problem areas are highlighted, with factual data provided throughout.

Shepherd, George W., Jr. The Politics of African Nationalism, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962.

The author attempts to present an overall view of the patterns and problems in the development of African nationalism.

Spence, J. E. The Strategic Significance of Southern Africa, London: Royal United Service Institute, 1972.

A comprehensive study of the importance of the Republic of South Africa within the context of the current political and economic conditions of the world. Presents an excellent background study of the political and military history of the Republic.

Spooner, F. P. South African Predicament, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1960.

The book provides the general background, from physical features to economic consequences, of apartheid.

Thompson, Leonard M. The Republic of South Africa, Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966.

Vanderbosch, Amry. South Africa and the World, Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1970.

Van Rensburg, Patrick. Guilty Land: The History of Apartheid, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962.

By describing those events in his life which changed him from a government employee to one of its extreme opponents, the author indicates the tragedy of misunderstanding on South Africa.

Walker, Eric A. History of South Africa, London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1960.

Walshe, A. P. The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress 1912-1952, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971.

B. PERIODICALS

Adam, Heribert. "Conquest and Conflict in South Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 13, No. 4 (1975).

"Apartheid in the Union of South Africa," International Review Service, VI, No. 57 (1960).

"Apartheid Under Pressure," The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, April 1975, pp. 119-126.

An in-depth look at the pressures being placed upon apartheid and South African Prime Minister Vorster's "detente" policy.

Bissell, Richard E. "African Unity Twelve Years Later," Current History, 68, No. 405 (1975).

_____. "South Africa and International Ostracism," World Affairs, Winter 1974, pp. 179-186.

The African campaign to drive South Africa out of all international organizations and the country's reactions are described in detail.

"Blacks Storm Schools, Force Boycott in South Africa," Washington Post, January 16, 1977.

Business Week, June 8, 1974, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Jerome Capinada, The Times [London], January 22, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Chicago Tribune, August 6 through August 29, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Christian Science Monitor, Eastern ed., November 2, 1973 through January 19, 1977.

Most, but not all of the articles are as cited in the New York Times Information Bank. The magazine tends to remain free of political biases in conducting its investigations of the apartheid policies.

Conference of Independent African States, Plenary Session 2, Resolutions 2, A and B, and Agenda Item II, "Decolonization."

In reviewing the documents of this meeting, the air of disorganization and disagreement is readily apparent concerning active measures against apartheid.

Deadline Data on World Affairs. South Africa General Data, (1972).

Elias, T. O. "The Charter of the OAU," American Journal of International Law, April 1965.

El-Khawas, Mohamed. "Third World Stance on Apartheid," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8, No. 3 (1970).

Feit, Edward. "Urban Revolt in South Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 8, No. 1 (1970).

Gann, Lewis. "No Hope for Violent Liberation," Africa Report, February 1972.

Guelke, Adrian. "Africa as a Market for South African Goods," The Journal of Modern African Studies, XII (Spring, 1974), 69-88.

A study refuting the belief by some that Prime Minister Vorster's foreign policy is primarily an economic one, with little to do with fostering apartheid.

Hoagland, Jim. "New Era of Black Defiance Jolts Afrikaner Complacency," Washington Post, January 9, 1977.

_____. "The New Black: Educated, Frustrated," Washington Post, January 10, 1977.

_____. "Afrikaners Split Over Apartheid," Washington Post, January 11, 1977.

_____. "Black Power in South Africa: Anonymous Youth Movement," Washington Post, January 12, 1977.

_____. "Whites Get Taste of Fear," Washington Post, January 13, 1977.

_____. "Police: Feared Guardians of White Privilege," Washington Post, January 14, 1977.

_____. "South Africa's Coloreds: 'Your Own Dog Bites You Hardest'," Washington Post, January 15, 1977.

_____. "South Africa: How Many Blacks Are Whites Ready to Kill?," Washington Post, January 16, 1977.

_____. "Black Opposition Mounts to U.S. Investment in South Africa," Washington Post, January 14, 1977.

Hobart-Houghton, D. "Economic Development in the Reserves," Race Relations Journal, 29, No. 1 (1962).

An excellent treatise on the "labor pool" and "tax wage" concepts inherent in the policy of separate development of the Bantustans.

Hovey, G. New York Times, Final Late City ed., February 7, 1972.

_____. New York Times, Final Late City ed., February 10, 1972.

Howe, Russell Warren. "War in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, 48, No. 1 (1962).

Isaacs, Harold. "Five Writers and Their African Ancestors," Plydon, 3rd Quarter (1960).

Journal of Commerce, June 14, 1973, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Judge, Joseph. "The Zulus: Black Nation in a Land of Apartheid," National Geographic, 140, No. 6 (1971).

Knife, Michael. The Times [London], November 12, 1973, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Legum, Colin. "The Soviet Union, China and the West in Southern Africa," Foreign Affairs, 54, no. 1 (1976).

Leighton, Neil O. "A Perspective on Fundamental Change in Southern Africa: Lusaka--Before and Beyond," Africa Today, 23, No. 3 (1976).

Lewis, Anthony. New York Times, Final Late City ed., June 12, 1975.

_____. New York Times, Final Late City ed., September 21, 1975.

Lipton, Merle. "Independent Bantustans?," International Affairs, 48, No. 1 (1972).

_____. "South Africa: Authoritarian Reform?," The World Today, XXX (June, 1974), 250-258.
An excellent discussion of current Nationalist Party politics, to include future prospects. The divisions within the white leadership are also discussed.

Los Angeles Times, March 27, 1975 through August 29, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

London Observer, January 16, 1972 through April 20, 1975, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Manchester Guardian, February 8 through August 15, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

McKeon, Nora. "The African States and the CAU," International Affairs, July 1966.

"Measures Against South Africa," U.N. Review, December 1962.

Mohr, C. New York Times, Final Late City ed., November 27, 1972.

Morlan, Gail J. New York Times, Final Late City ed., September 10, 1976.

"Move to End Facial Friction," Africa Research Bulletin, June 15, 1975, pp. 3624-3625.

New York Times, Final Late City ed., July 13, 1970 through November 27, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

The fifty-eight articles as cited in the Information Bank provided the most relevant and up-to-date chronology of current events as are occurring within the Republic of South Africa.

Organization of African Unity Documents AHG/Res. 6 (1) through AHG/Res. 9 (1) and CM/103 through CM/497.

A review of the OAU's documents revealed a trend toward disunity and apathy which has been demonstrated by the organization's lack of recent support of South African liberation movements.

Ottaway, David. Washington Post, April 16, 1976.

Potholm, Christian P. "South Africa: White Lager Under Pressure," Current History, 71, No. 421 (1976).

_____. "The Future of Africa South," Current History, 60, No. 355 (1971).

Quigg, Philip W. "South African Problems and Prospects," Africa Report, January, 1965.

Rivkin, Arnold. "The Organization of African Unity," Current History, April, 1965.

Rogers, Barbara. "Freedom Demand is Spreading," Africa Report, February, 1972.

Seiler, John. "South African Perspectives and Responses to External Pressure," The Journal of Modern African Studies, XIII (Fall, 1975), 447-468.

The treatise demonstrates the effects of external pressures on the formulation of South African foreign policy.

Shepherd, George W., Jr. "From Counter-Revolution to Majority Rule: Can U.S. Policy Change?," Africa Today, 23, No. 3 (1976).

Skurnik, W. A. E. "Africa and the Superpowers," Current History, 71, No. 421 (1976).

"South Africa," African Digest, October, 1962.

Southern Africa, September 19, 1970.

Spence, J. E. "South Africa's Uncertain Future," The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, April 1975, pp. 159-165.

Sulzberger, C. L. New York Times, Final Late City ed., November 27, 1976.

Symonds, Jane. "Apartheid and Foreign Firms," Africa Digest, April, 1971.

An interesting discussion of the possibility of foreign firms being among the first factions to bring

an end to apartheid by investing in the African homelands and fostering equality within their industries in South Africa.

"Text of Draft Resolution," U.N. Monthly Chronicle, XII (June, 1975), 6, 8.

Article includes details of the proposal to levy Article VII sanctions on South Africa, as well as the reasons for the veto of the draft resolution.

The Economist, March 20 through April 10, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

The Times [London], July 20, 1971 through September 30, 1976, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

The twenty-two articles as cited in the Information Bank provided an excellent chronology of current events within the Republic of South Africa, with very little political bias noted.

The Star [Johannesburg], October 3, 1970.

U.N., General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, A/5497/Addendum 1, 18th Session, September 26, 1963.

U.S. News and World Report, February 7, 1972, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Wall Street Journal, August 27, 1973, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

Walshe, A. P. "The Origins of African Political Consciousness in South Africa," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 7, No. 4 (1969).

Wright, Robin. "South African Catholics to Integrate," Washington Post, February 12, 1977.

_____. "South Africa Parliament: No Major Initiatives," Washington Post, January 22, 1977.

Younghusband, Peter. Washington Post, August 9, 1973, as cited in the New York Times Information Bank.

C. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Information for the Armed Forces, "U.S. Policy: Africa," Information Guidance Series, No. 7-22 (Rev. 1), November, 1975.

U.S., Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Area Handbook for the Republic of South Africa, DA Form 550-92, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971.

U.S., Department of State, "The Organization of African Unity," Department of State Bulletin, May 3, 1965.

_____. "U.N. Considers Problem of Racial Discrimination in South Africa; Sets Up Committee to Study Sanctions," Department of State Bulletin, XLVII, No. 1221 (1962).

_____. "U.N. Security Council Condemns Apartheid in South Africa," Department of State Bulletin, LI, No. 1306 (1954).